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'Contact Group' Reaches Agreement on B-H Map

LD2906235594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2310 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Paris, June 29 (TANJUG)—The "Contact Group" for Bosnia-Herzegovina has agreed on a precise map for dividing Bosnia, French Foreign Ministry Spokesman Richard Duque said Wednesday. The "Contact Group" representatives from the United States, Russian and European Union met behind closed doors in Paris Tuesday.

Duque said the contact group had reached agreement on a precise map to be presented, "when the time comes, to Bosnia's warring sides"—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Serbs.

A Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman said earlier Wednesday, in Brussels, that the maps would be shown to Bosnia's warring sides on July 5, but TANJUG's Geneva correspondent quoted Palais des Nations sources as saying the Bosnian sides would see the maps on July 6. Duque said the contact group had already agreed upon ways to punish or reward the warring sides depending on their responses. He did not elaborate.

The Contact Group's proposals still need to get the green light from the ministerial meeting of the United States, Russia and the European Union Set to be held in Geneva in early July.

The Contact Group has acted upon an earlier decision to split Bosnia by giving 51 percent of the territory to the Moslem-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs now hold about 70 percent of Bosnia and are willing to cede land on the condition that the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Serb Republic is maintained.

UN, NATO To Expand Cooperation on Cease-Fire

LD2906223494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2225 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Brussels, June 29 (TANJUG)—The United Nations (U.N.) and NATO will in future expand its cooperation on monitoring the ceasefire and establishing lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was announced at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on Wednesday. Deputy NATO Secretary General Sergio Balanzino said following talks with special U.N. envoy Yasushi Akashi that all possibilities for cooperation between the U.N. and NATO in establishing lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO's role in supervising the peace treaty had been considered.

In the event of the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.N.-NATO cooperation will be on an expanded level, Akashi said, and his words were interpreted as an offer and invitation to NATO to secure sufficient staff and means for monitoring the peace. The next few weeks will be decisive for the destiny of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Akashi said.

NATO sources who did not wish to be named told reporters that the need for cooperation with NATO and the U.N. would be greater and not smaller if peace was established. The source also said that NATO's role would be bigger simply because the U.N. would have to take advantage of NATO's vast infrastructure potential.

Akashi told TANJUG that the decisions of these two major international organizations could have credibility only if applied equally to all three warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ΩSocialists, Democrats Interpret Hungarian Vote

94P20940A

[Editorial Report] The 9 May Hungarian elections, in which the Socialist Party received 33 percent of the vote and obtained an absolute majority in parliament, have served as a focal point for debate in the Albanian press on Albania's own postcommmunist prospects. Articles in the Albanian Socialist Party [PSSh] organ, ZERI I POPULLIT, and the ruling Albanian Democratic Party [PDSh] daily, RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, reflected the two parties' divergent interpretations of the impact of the Hungarian vote.

Democratic Party Hails Free Elections, Rejects Analogies

In an article titled "No Analogies Are in Order," in the 13 May edition of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, Andon Dede presented arguments against making an analogy between the situations in Albania and in Hungary. "Is there a chance that 'renovated' Socialists might win in Albania if elections were held? The campaign undertaken by our Socialists is accompanied by attractive promises, which become even more enticing under the conditions of this difficult transition. ... The analogy is not valid for this simple reason: Hungary is far removed from us in economic, political, and social development, and our Socialist Party is far removed from the Hungarian party.... After World War II, the communist parties and leaders in the two countries faced different problems.... Hungary was the first country in the communist east to understand the inefficiency of the Soviet-type centralized socialist economy and to enact liberalizing reforms and to introduce elements of the market economy.... The current Hungarian Socialist Party chairman, Gyula Horn, was the foreign minister who facilitated the emigration of East Germans to Austria and West Germany, while our officials, headed by Ramiz Alia, mercilessly killed and barbarically dragged back those who attempted to cross the border. Therefore, there is no comparison between the predemocracy phases in our two countries."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 14 May presented excerpts of President Sali Berisha's Albanian Television interview upon his return from Romania and Hungary in which he called upon the Albanians to take cautionary note of the Hungarian experience. Berisha said: "My meeting with Hungarian President Goncz took place the day after the free elections in that country, elections which were a victory for democracy. I would like to add that these elections provided some lessons for all the people of Eastern Europe. One important lesson of these elections was the fact that they took place at this time, after four years, which means that there was an individual and political decision in Hungary to respect free elections, and that respect for free elections is the core and the first lesson of every democracy. Another very strong and very important lesson from the elections in Hungary was the fact that the Hungarian people, with their free vote, did not put into parliament any of the extremist parties, or any fascists or fascist wing, or any extremists who would like to oppress the people and crush their skulls. They put into power those parties which they thought could expand democratic processes and reforms. These lessons are very important for all of us who are on the road to democracy and, most certainly, we have much to learn from each other's experience."

Socialists Reject Berisha's Conclusions

In an article titled "Yes! It Is True: The Hungarian Voters Did Not Vote for Extremists. They Voted for the Socialist Party," published in ZERI I POPULLIT on 14 May, Saimir Molla faulted Berisha's TV statement for not mentioning that the recent elections had put the Socialist Party into power. The May vote "overturned the results of the elections of four years earlier which brought the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) into power and drove out the ex-Communists who later reorganized into the Socialist Party, the winner in the current elections." He noted, moreover, that the MDF received only 12 percent of the votes.

Molla listed the "real reasons" for the "terrible loss" suffered by the MDF, claiming that they "are not simply a Hungarian phenomenon but are inherent in the transition from one system to another, with similar manifestations in all the Eastern European countries." The factors leading to the MDF's downfall, he maintained, are massive unemployment, a privatization policy which favors the privileged and encourages corruption, the paralysis of national industry by imports, inflation, devaluation of currency, increasing numbers of retirees and the worsening of their economic situation, and loss of confidence and security.

Socialist Party Leaders Congratulate Victors

ZERI I POPULLIT of 10 May featured prominently on the front page a message sent to Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Fatos Nano, chairman of the PSSh, who is currently serving a 12-year prison sentence for crimes committed as an official of the former communist regime. Warmly congratulating the Hungarian Socialists, Nano told Horn that "in the name of the PSSh, I am expressing best wishes and confidence that you will be able to use this victory to create the necessary political consensus, to accelerate democratic reforms in the market economy, and to reduce their cost to society, on the basis of the European social democratic vision and the alternative programs of government of the Socialist Party of Hungary, which we got to know very well as a result of the close relations between our parties."

Following up on Nano's message, PSSh Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi and PSSh Foreign Relations Secretary Bashkim Zeneli met with Hungarian Ambassador to Albania Ferenc Poka at PSSh headquarters in Tirana on 7 June to discuss the similarities between the Hungarian and Albanian socialist parties and their places in their respective countries' politics. ZERI I

POPULLIT reported on 8 June that Pellumbi congratulated the ambassador on the "peaceful and democratic" elections, stating that the Albanian Socialists "are happy" that the Hungarian Socialists, "with whom we have very good relations," won the elections because "we have high regard for the experience of the Hungarian Socialist Party."

Then, according to the article, Pellumbi "presented the PSSh's views on the tense situation in Albania and the violation of human rights, which is clearly expressed in the political trial staged against PSSh Chairman Fatos Nano." He claimed that Albania is not observing international standards for membership in the Council of Europe. He also gave the ambassador a "detailed report" on the 29 May elections in some Albanian communes—in particular Libofshe, Greshice, and Zall-Herr—where, he claimed, the Democratic Party used antidemocratic and illegal methods and violence against deputies. "These elections alone make our call for early elections more convincing.... The machinations, violence, and violations of the law, such as the use of the military in Zall-Herr, are indications of the voters' lack of support for the Democratic Party."

Zieleniec Wants To See New ODS Program

AU2906143494 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, by Marek Stonis; place and date not given: "Certain Reversals in Politics Are Necessary"]

[Text] Last week, Deputy Richard Mandelik's view that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] needs a program that would react to everyday problems appeared in the press. We asked ODS Deputy Chairman Josef Zieleniec whether there really is a chance of the party splitting if the ODS does not undergo a sort of self-examination.

[Zieleniec] When I speak about a new program in the ODS, I do not necessarily mean a program in the form of a written text. I rather mean a political vision that would create a certain arranging principle for everyday reality. Our political activities would then become a logical fulfillment of this framework, and the citizens and the ODS electorate would know that our activity not only is governed by the momentary political boom, but also has a more logical goal. This means to include problems of routine politics in a vision that is politically convincing. This is what we are discussing within the ODS and what is related to something that could be called the credibility of the party. Because this vision has not yet been clearly formulated, some of our steps may easily appear illogical.

[Stonis] What specific decisions of your party taken in the most recent time are difficult to explain?

[Zieleniec] I would like to stress the importance of what they call the "trade off" in economic theory—that is, "tit for tat" in Czech. It is self-evident that, in complicated political conditions after the establishment of the state, it must often happen that individual decisions are corrected and opinions change. However, it is important to be able to do it in such as way as not to lose credibility. When making any important change, we have to be precisely aware of the "tit for tat" principle—that is, whether the correction is worth the subsequent loss of several points on the abstract scale on which confidence is measured. There are situations where it is important to stick to the original decision even if it is not the best one—just to stand the test as someone who sticks to his word. On other occasions, our word has to be changed even at the cost of political loss. In this context, we often discuss in the ODS the way our opinion on higher administrative units has changed or in what way our discussion on filling the senate has developed.

[Stonis] When you spoke about the new program vision at the ODS congress in the fall, your idea met with a lack of understanding on the part of ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus. Has there been any change in that respect?

[Zieleniec] This is not only the problem of the party chairman. The entire development within the ODS is involved. More and more people tell me that they are beginning to understand what I said at that time. Among them are people who did not agree with me at the time. Since then, the atmosphere within the party has been more favorable. I am convinced that some of the coming executive councils will open up these problems. As I say, the thing is not necessarily to produce documents but to change the way our party addresses the public, particularly the electorate.

Ω Army Equipment, Logistics Modernization

94P200935A

[Editorial Report] Several articles in the 3 May issue of the Czech defense weekly ARMADNI REPORT discussed developments in Czech defense modernization and procurement.

Czech MiG's Test French Missile

An article by Vlastimil Stana described cooperation between the Czech and the French Air Forces to determine the compatibility of French-made air-to-air missiles with Czech fighter aircraft. Two MiG-23's and a technical support team were dispatched to the 118th Air Base of the French Air Force in Mont de Marsan in southern France, where they made 11 flights testing the R 550 Magic 2 missile, manufactured by the French missile producer Matra. French Mirage 2000's assisted the Czech planes in simulating aerial combat situations. The Magic 2 was found to be fully compatible with Czech systems.

Logistics, Equipment Modernization

At a press conference in which the Army's logistics inspector, Major General Miroslav Kostelka, discussed current Czech Army modernization efforts, the general noted that the Army's logistic system has been thoroughly reorganized and improved, in particular through a simplification of brigade- and battalion-level systems. He noted that Czech transportation units moved 20,000 tons of materiel by road and 250,000 tons by rail in 1993, and would ship another 21,000 tons by road and 160,000 tons by rail this year.

The general regretted that the current ratio of investments to consumption expenditures remains unfavorable. While the Army budget should be devoting 30 percent of its expenditures to investments, he said, the actual figure is under 10 percent.

Kostelka also reported that the Army is soliciting bids for various items of military hardware to continue the modernization of combat and support capabilities. He added that, by June, a decision should be reached on which all-terrain personnel carrier to procure for the use of the new rapid-deployment brigade.

NATO Logistic Norms

An article by Lieutenant Colonel Oldrich Hodanek points out that Czech Army logisticians are working together with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to develop logistic systems that conform to NATO norms. Czech officers are currently consulting with NAMSA as part of their efforts to develop coding, nomenclature, packaging, and data-processing systems that are compatible with their NATO counterparts. The initial visit of Czech officers to NAMSA headquarters is said to have been the first contact between that agency and representatives of a former Warsaw Pact army.

Problems in Surplus Disposal

In an interview with ARMADNI REPORT journalist Vladimir Marek, Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek responded to media reports that the Supreme Control Office (NKU), the Czech equivalent of the U.S. General Accounting Office, had uncovered evidence of illegal dealings in Army sales of surplus and obsolete equipment. Kalousek contended that media coverage had been misleading because it implied that there were ongoing problems with military equipment sales, while the NKU report actually covered the period 1990-93. He conceded that numerous violations of rules and ethics had occurred in the period between the fall of the communist government and the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state, but he explained that these could be traced to the "unintelligible" nature of the then valid laws. Kalousek said that, in 1993, the new Czech Republic defense minister had immediately imposed a temporary halt to all sales and that, since their resumption, all sales have been subject to government approval. All disposal of nonlethal equipment is large-scale, based on an open bidding process.

Kovac: U.S. Concerned About Meciar Comeback

AU2906133894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 28 Jun 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "According to Michal Kovac, U.S. Representatives Are Afraid of Vladimir Meciar's Return to Power"]

[Text] Bratislava—The United States appreciates the political steps taken by Slovakia and Hungary toward understanding between the two countries and in relation to ethnic minorities and contributing thereby toward stability in the Central European region. This was stated by President Michal Kovac following his return from the United States yesterday.

Michal Kovac understands French President Francois Mitterrand's promise to visit Slovakia in September as an expression of interest in encouraging Slovak citizens and assuring them of support if they will vote for entities oriented toward the continuation of policies that will convince foreign partners about the Slovak Republic's credibility. He said that, at a number of meetings with important U.S. representatives, the question of Vladimir Meciar's comeback was raised, and certain fears of this possibility appeared. Kovac also commented on the different views of Ministers Peter Magvasi and Milan Janicina on the privatization process. He said that he did not perceive those differences as a dispute, adding that they must be resolved in the Coalition Council. If he felt that this was a dispute within the coalition, which he does not assume, and his involvement in it would be useful, he would request a meeting with members of the Coalition Council and try to find a satisfactory solution.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 28 June on page 2 carries a 400-word Julius Gembicky report on President Kovac's comments after his return from the United States. It includes the following passage: "Michal Kovac said that his meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton was the fourth within a short period of time. At this last meeting, he clearly felt a change in his attitude toward Slovakia in connection with the inauguration of Jozef Moravcik's government. Until then, there existed a large number of reservations about domestic policies, and it was not just pure coincidence that also other countries of the European Union [as published] were omitting us from the list of potential partner countries." The NARODNA OBRODA report also quotes Kovac as having said that "there exists no prejudice toward Slovakia in the United States but, rather, a lack of information. I have noticed the readiness to perceive our country as an equal partner of the other Visegrad Four countries."]

Initiatives Expected From German EU Presidency

AU3006093994 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 30 Jun 94 p 3

[Text] Vienna—Slovakia expects the German European Union [EU] presidency, which will begin on 1 July, to provide "more specific initiatives to bring the associated countries closer to the EU." This was stated by Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan in Vienna on 29 June. Kukan, a nonaffiliated professional diplomat, spoke in the Palffy Palace at the invitation of the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations.

Slovakia's security policy is clearly aimed at membership in NATO and in the Western European Union (WEU), which has the overwhelming support of "public and political opinion" in the country, Kukan stressed. In February, Slovakia signed the skeleton agreement for NATO's "Partnership for Peace" and has meanwhile also deposited the so-called presentation document (with proposals for specific cooperation) at NATO.

As regards the East, Slovakia considers the expansion of cooperation with Ukraine as particularly important, Kukan said.

Agriculture Minister Accuses EU of 'Blackmail'

AU2906132794 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Stefan Mistrik: "Agricultural Unemployment—An Underrated Phenomenon; Minister Koncos: I Am Not Afraid of Saying It: They Were Blackmailing Us!"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—"It can be said that the conduct of Mr. Steichen and his people from the European Union [EU] Commission toward us during the negotiations on certificates was not trustworthy [seriozne]. I am not afraid of saying it—they were blackmailing us with the (non-) signing of the GATT protocol. I am saying this even though the European Union is involved. I believe that our mutual relations should be those between two equal partners, even if we are a small country....," Minister of Agriculture Koncos told us yesterday in connection with the "agreement" on the recognition of OECD certificates for fruit and vegetables. We did not want to recognize certificates for imported potatoes, tomatoes, green peppers, and cucumbers. [passage omitted]

At yesterday's news conference, reporters also learned that agricultural unemployment is starting to be critical in some districts. In Rimavska Sobota district, for example, it has reached almost 40 percent and in neighboring Velky Krtis district 28.2 percent. The structure of the economy in those districts is such that farmers can scarcely find jobs in other branches. In the past four years, the agricultural labor force declined 40.9 percent, which represents about 127,000 people. [passage omitted]

In 1989, Slovak agriculture employed 12.4 workers per 100 hectares; today there are only 7.7. This means that agricultural production is becoming more efficient. The fact is therefore mind-boggling that wages in farming are almost 16 percent lower than the Slovak average for all branches of the economy. [passage omitted]

Reporters learned, furthermore, that the situation in milk consumption continues to be catastrophic. [passage omitted] Slovaks consume only slightly over 170 kilograms of milk and dairy products. Physicians say that annual consumption should be at a level of 220 kilograms. The level of Slovaks' calcium intake is supposedly declining dangerously....

Pro-Meciar Editors Protest 'Interventions'

AU2906124694

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 27 June on pages 1 and 2 carries a 700-word Eva Zelenayova report on the Second Assembly of the Association of Slovak Journalists [ZSN], which was held in Bratislava on 25 June. On the same day, on page 1, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA carries a 200-word "statement" adopted at the assembly, which protests alleged "serious interventions in civil liberties and freedom of the press" by the current Slovak Government.

In her report, Zelenayova notes that the ZSN, which associates "more than 750 members," elected a 27-member ZSN Council and a new chairman, Jozef Darmo, who replaced in this position Jan Smolec, chief editor of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. Zelenayova observes that, while the assembly was addressed by Vladimir Meciar, chairman of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and Jozef Prokes, honorary chairman of the Slovak National Party, the chairman of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists and the directors of Slovak Radio, Slovak Television, and the TA SR "did not participate in the assembly, although they had been invited."

The statement adopted at the ZSN Assembly reads: "We, ZSN members, state that a part of present Slovak journalists do not identify with Slovak independence and still do not understand journalism as a service to the citizen, which greatly contributes to the destabilization of society. A low standard of communication, lack of professionalism, and violations of journalistic ethics are frequently dominant in the media. The ZSN is interested in a dialogue between both Slovak organizations of journalists [the ZSN and the Syndicate of Slovak Journalists] and a joint search for ways out of this hopeless situation.

"The 100 days of activity of the present Slovak Government have been marked by serious interventions in civil liberties, freedom of the press, and the operation of Slovak Television as a public corporation. By its concessions to foreign interests, the sellout of national property, and violations of democratic principles of government in relation to the public, the government jeopardizes the national and state interests of the Slovak Republic."

Government Rejects Accusations

AU2906124894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "The Government Protests"]

[Text] Bratislava—"Journalists avowing their allegiance to the Association of Slovak Journalists (ZSN), who constitute only one-third of the journalistic community in Slovakia, demonstrated in their statement on the first 100 days of Jozef Moravcik's government that their hallmark is demagoguery and not a realistic assessment of facts. Many of them publish in this vein on the pages of the daily [SLOVENSKA] REPUBLIKA. The accusations of serious interventions in civil liberties and the freedom of the press leveled against the present Cabinet are untrue and a self-serving lie." This was stated by the Press and Information Department [TIO] of the Slovak Government Office in reaction to Saturday's statement of delegates to the second ZSN assembly, which the TIO made available to the TA SR yesterday. The accusations that the Slovak Government jeopardizes the national and state interests of the Slovak Republic are truly unprecedented demagoguery, for which the authors of the statement do not have any factual, moral, or ethical justification.

Social Democratic Party in Slovakia Splits

AU2906130794 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Jun 94 p 3

[TA SR report: "Split in the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia Consummated"]

[Text] Bratislava—Jozef Hruby, hitherto deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [SDSS], and SDSS Central Council members Vladimir Trnkus and Alena Kuniakova are not SDSS members anymore. This was stated by the SDSS Central Council at its meeting in Bratislava on 25 June. The decision is based on the petition for the registration of a new political entity—the Party of Social Democracy [Strana socialnej demokracie]—which Hruby, Trnkus, and Kuniakova initiated on 15 June.

Justifying their step in the petition, those leaving the SDSS, who have been joined also by Bernard Bolgac, another member of the SDSS Central Council, stated that the SDSS had not fulfilled the public's expectations because its coalition with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] binds it too closely to that party and threatens its identity.

"The Central Council did not permit a debate on the situation in the party and decided to expel people who have publicly expressed reservations about its policy. On the basis of this step, it has been decided to set up a new political entity," former SDSS Deputy Chairman Jozef Hruby told the TA SR in an interview. It is expected to be registered next week.

Jozef Hruby assumes that one-half of the SDSS members will join the new Social Democracy, whose ranks will also be enlarged by sympathizers and by those who had left the SDSS even earlier because of its rapprochement with the SDL.

According to information from the SDSS Central Council, a majority of SDSS local and regional organizations expressed support for its present leadership headed by Jaroslav Volf. At the same time, the Central Council condemned the separatist initiative of the group rallied around former Deputy Chairman Jozef Hruby.

The Central Council approved the order of SDSS candidates on the slates for the fall parliamentary elections. Number-one candidate on the Bratislava slate is Mojmir Mamojka. The west Slovak slate is headed by Jaroslav Volf, the central Slovak by Boris Zala, and the slate in the east Slovak constituency by Marcela Gburova.

SLS Elects Chairman, Approves Name Change

AU2906131494 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by "ba"]

[Text] Zilina—The Fourth Assembly of the Slovak People's Party [SLS] was held in Zilina-Brodno on 25 June. The delegates elected a new party Presidium, with Frantisek Kalesny at its head. Former SLS leader Jozef Prokop became honorary party chairman for life. The SLS has 1,500 members. The most important change approved by the assembly enables former members of the Communist Party who are not discredited by active support for the communist regime to become party members. Until now, the SLS was the sole political entity strictly observing the principle of not admitting former communists into its ranks. The assembly instructed the new party chairman to reregister the party under a new name—SLS-SLUB—because the party will initiate the founding of the Slovak Popular Bloc [Slovensky Ludovy Blok, SLUB]. The SLS intends to form SLUB together with political parties that are ready to push for the adoption of a law on anticommunist resistance as of the year 1945 and for an objective assessment of our modern history and the politicized retribution trials before the year 1948. The SLS seeks, furthermore, the abolition of 29 August [anniversary of Slovak National Uprising] as the national day of the Slovak Republic. SLS Spokesman Valentin Magdolen told us after the assembly that its participants considered the possibility of coalition cooperation with the Slovak National Party, the Christian Social Union, and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, but voices suggesting that the party contest the elections independently were also to be heard.

SIS Head Refuses To Comment on 'Shadow' Firm

AU2906155194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Vladimir Mitro, director of the Slovak Information Service, SIS, by Vladimir Jancura on 27 June; place not given: "Dr. Vladimir Mitro About the So-Called Shadow Secret Service: No One From the SIS Leadership Cooperates With It"]

[Text] It all started on the pages of [the east Slovak regional daily] SLOVENSKY VYCHOD. It published an interview with Ludovit Cernak, in which the deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic confirmed the existence of a private firm that is working as an information (shadowing?) agency for Vladimir Meciar. Subsequently, NARODNA OBRODA came up with the assertion that, "according to indications," this private agency supposedly cooperates with a high-level official of the Slovak Information Service (SIS). Yesterday we asked SIS Director Vladimir Mitro, LL.D., a few questions:

[Jancura] Mr. Director, what has intrigued you most about the published reports about the existence of a so-called parallel or shadow intelligence agency that is supposedly gathering information on representatives of the government coalition?

[Mitro] First of all, I have to say that I have just returned from an official tour of duty abroad, where I learned about the whole affair only indirectly. Right now I can only react to the claim that a person is supposedly active in the SIS leadership who cooperates with some private security agency. I clearly refute this claim. As for the existence of other, quasi intelligence services or fictitious intelligence services, I would not like to comment on that.

[Jancura] The private agency in question was supposedly collecting "unofficial" information about the highest political representatives of the Slovak Republic already under the government of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar....

[Mitro] I will not comment on this, either.

[Jancura] Let me ask differently: If the SIS discovered anything of that sort, what would it undertake?

[Mitro] That would depend on the nature of such a service—whether it would exist in harmony with the law or whether it exceeded valid laws. Of course, we would provide the pertinent information to the relevant authorities, as is our duty.

[Jancura] Is there nothing you would like to add to the whole affair?

[Mitro] Perhaps only this much: I would like to assure all readers that the SIS is working in accordance with the law.

[Jancura] Let me ask one more question: If you found out that some leading SIS official was working for some dubious private agency, what would happen?

[Mitro] I would immediately take disciplinary and personnel measures.

Former Defense Minister Criticizes Policy

AU2906134494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (HZDS supplement) in Slovak 23 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by former Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak: "Will the Army Be Impartial?"]

[Text] *The preparation of numerous important documents in the sphere of Slovak military policy is now nearing completion. Former Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak was also involved in drafting many of them. We have already published his comments on the Partnership for Peace [PFP] presentation document. In his opinion, the present government has also made a mistake in spurning the Marshall Institute, which I. Andrejcak had already pledged to establish in Bratislava. The current administrators of the Defense Ministry and the provisional government, as is apparent from the following comments by I. Andrejcak, are also making other changes about which the former defense minister has reservations. His comments are also revealing because the important defense policy documents are now the subject of discussion by the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] committees, and the opinion of the former defense minister should be taken into consideration. After all, issues that concern not only the provisional government are involved here. We will be glad to publish the defense minister's response to the comments and questions of former Minister I. Andrejcak.*

The Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine

1. On the basis of what decision was the Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic revised? The former Slovak Government and then the Slovak Defense Council had already approved the Defense Doctrine. Did the Defense Council annul the original doctrine? Or did this involve a lack of respect for the resolution adopted by the Defense Council and the government?

2. The author should explain what new suggestions or facts have been introduced into the new version of the Defense Doctrine. When I compared it with the text of the original Defense Doctrine, I did not find any substantial change, but the current formulation is more reminiscent of the terminology used at the lectures for the Marxist-Leninist preparation of officers under the Warsaw Pact.

3. Why is there no undertaking in the Defense Doctrine to adhere to the treaty on conventional armed forces? The reason for this question is that it is necessary to reduce the number of designated posts in the Army before November 1995, and this long and organizationally demanding process has still not begun. If the defense minister does not make a decision soon on the method of reducing the number of designated posts, it will be necessary to discharge a large number of officers from the Army in 1995, or the Slovak Republic's compliance with the international undertaking that limits the number of Army personnel will be put at risk.

4. The provisional government establishes in the Defense Doctrine the impartiality and domestic-political neutrality of the Armed Forces. I have a question for the defense minister: Is the annulment of the personnel orders on discharging from the Army the former political staffers whom none of the commanders were willing to take under their supervision because of their lack of qualifications—and who themselves refused to take part in a retraining course for nonpolitical posts—proof of impartiality in the Army or of its rebuttal?

Apropos the Partnership for Peace Presentation Document

1. A commitment is made in the presentation document in Item 10, Paragraph 2, and I quote: ...To have a military unit consisting of one battalion constantly on alert. It is necessary for the proposer to provide a calculation of the costs this commitment entails. First and foremost, it is necessary to explain the following:

a) Under what salary conditions the Defense Ministry can meet the numbers for the promised battalion with career soldiers and [soldiers] in other service, or whether the ministry intends to propose that soldiers in basic service be selected for these units.

b) How much it will cost to provide the unit with communications equipment and other hardware and supplies.

c) Once the establishment of the promised battalion is under way, how long it will take to constitute it so that we fulfill the commitment laid down in the presentation document—to have a military unit constantly on alert.

d) Does the minister really intend to keep this promise, or will the presentation document be discussed again within NATO and based on the Slovak Republic's real possibilities?

2. In Item 10, Paragraph 4, there is a commitment to establish a NATO-PFP presentation and educational center in Bratislava for specialists from the countries participating in the Partnership for Peace project destined for activity in the international peacekeeping forces. As far as I know, all of the agreements concluded until now between defense ministries are based on the principle that the host country will pay the costs of the visit. It is also a principle of the PFP that the proposer himself bears the costs of the action proposed. I demand that a calculation of the size of the financial commitment involved be provided, and I want to know from which part of the military budget the money to pay for this center will come.

The Draft NR SR Law on Military Intelligence

1. The term "military intelligence" is used in Article 1. It is essential to define the substance of the term "military intelligence" owing to the subject matter of the draft law. According to the military terminology applied to date, the following are understood by the term "military

intelligence": agency and operational reconnaissance; ground, air, radio, and radiotechnical reconnaissance. Consequently, reconnaissance units, task groups, and formations at various levels of command are an element of the current concept of military intelligence. The range of powers proposed in the law cannot be permitted among all military intelligence officers, in accordance with current terminology, because more than 50 percent of the people covered by this term are soldiers in basic service. Such a situation and such power for soldiers in intelligence units and groups is not to be found anywhere in the world.

I suggest that the legislator define precisely the substance of the term "military intelligence" and that the elements for conducting intelligence activity be itemized terminologically and conceptually in peacetime abroad and among the troops and separately at a time of the state's defense alert.

Apropos Dispatching a Mission to Nagorno Karabakh

a) It is necessary to explain to the public what the contribution of individual European states is in fulfilling the tasks of the UN peacekeeping missions and to disclose what the contribution to involvement is, for example, of the Czech Republic and a number of other European states.

b) What the cost of and the means of paying for the proposed mission to Nagorno Karabakh is, and to the detriment of which resources from the Defense Ministry's budget the resources for this mission are being drawn.

Filkus: Economic Results Worse Than Expected

LD2906165594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Excerpts] The 34th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic continues in Bratislava today. [passage omitted]

The first point on today's agenda was the presentation of the Final Account of the Slovak Republic for last year, delivered by Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus. This opened a bloc of economic bills, which are on the agenda of deputies' debate. My colleague Dagmar Bazlikova will tell us live from the parliament which of these bills parliament has managed to discuss so far.

[Bazlikova] [passage omitted] Shortly after 0900, National Council Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska opened the second day of the 34th meeting and asked Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus to deliver the first point on the agenda, the government-sponsored draft of the 1993 State Final Account.

Minister Filkus said that, as a result of both objective and subjective factors, as far as the key economic indicators were concerned, the real economic development, apart from the unemployment rate, had strongly differed from the projected targets. Far worse results than expected were attained. Compared with 1992, the gross domestic product has dropped by 4 percent. Inflation has risen on average by 23 percent. Unemployment has grown to almost 14.5 percent, and the number of unemployed has grown by more than 100,000 people. Although in comparison with 1992 the retail trade turnover and takings have grown by 36 percent, the volume of investments has dropped by 6.5 percent. Both income and expenditure of the population grew in 1993, while the income grew more than the expenditure. [passage omitted]

The 1993 state budget deficit, which amounts to 23 billion korunas, resulted from the absence of budget regulations. Later, it contributed to the deepening of the imbalance in the economy.

According to Minister Filkus, inflationary finance policy and nonadherence to the aims of the budgetary and financial policy have led to the government sector's indebtedness at home and abroad. Minister Filkus also spoke about the measures the Finance Ministry adopted to remove the shortcomings found out during checks made by the Supreme Inspection Office in the individual departments of the Finance Ministry. [passage omitted]

The National Council of the Slovak Republic then approved the draft State Final Account for 1993 and asked the government, on the basis of the joint resolution of the committees, to accept measures initiated by the Supreme Inspection Office, to confirm subsidies in the case of drought, to safeguard the monitoring of taxes and payments, and so on.

The parliament also passed a government-sponsored bill on issuing state bonds that will cover the state budget deficit.

The deputies also passed amendments to the laws on consumer tax on wine and beer that delimit more exactly, among other things, the kinds of these beverages that are exempt from consumer tax. [passage omitted]

Official on Tasks of Prime Minister's Office

AU2906175194 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Jun 94 p 5

[Interview with Elemer Kiss, administrative state secretary-designate of the Prime Minister's Office, by Agnes Marvanyi; place and date not given: "The Office's Classical Tasks Have To Be Strengthened"]

[Text] The first task in the Prime Minister's Office will be to draw up the operational rules of the government structure as was laid down in the coalition agreement, we learned from Elemer Kiss, who is now the official administrative state secretary-designate.

[Marvanyi] Until the change of the regime, you had been the leader of the Office of the Council of Ministers. What are your views on the performance of the past four years and what has changed in the central administration?

[Kiss] I would only be able to assess the performance if I had been part of the events. I trust that the office carried out good, professional work, but I cannot give an opinion until I become more familiar with their activity.

[Marvanyi] Will there be further changes and replacements of personnel in the Prime Minister's Office?

[Kiss] In my view, the office has to be strengthened in its classical tasks, and everything that does not belong here has to be delegated to the relevant ministries. Accordingly, we will not have a political state secretary because the office for national minorities over and within the border does not belong to us, and the supervision of church, youth, and sports affairs will be carried out by the Ministry of Culture and Education. There will not be replacements among those who deal with classical legal administrative tasks; there is no need for this because experienced professionals are working in this area.

[Marvanyi] Although the coalition agreement contains certain ideas on legislation, the list is not at all complete. It is already clear that the ministries are going to submit dozens of proposals within a short period of time and they will start to lobby to get these proposals before the government as soon as possible. On what basis will you rank these, what will be the order of importance?

[Kiss] We have to set up a tough coordination and filtering system to assess the draft laws and decrees and to decide their order of importance. It is possible that the system of coordination between the ministries is lengthy and cumbersome, but we have to recognize the fact that various kinds of experts can only be found in various places. It would be a mistake to ignore their aggregate views, because this is the way the two to three alternative decisions from which the government will have to choose can crystallize. It is not unusual for 30-40 issues to be on the agenda of a government session; if they are well prepared, the decisionmakers can cope with this amount.

[Marvanyi] What will happen to the many thousands of written documents, the materials awaiting government decisions, that were left by the Boross government to the successors?

[Kiss] The new ministers will have to be given a chance to assess the materials themselves. They might decide to change them because they will bear responsibility for submitting them. They have to be examined to ensure that they are not in contradiction with the coalition agreement in any way. Generally, the coalition agreement is a starting point in our work because it determines several tasks: For example, it has instructions on the governmental structure, so the government's procedures have to be changed according to this and the procedures of the economic and national security cabinet will also have to be drawn up.

[Marvanyi] In the past four years, it has happened that, on the basis of mistaken or insufficient data, government decisions were made whose consequences the government did not foresee. How can this be avoided and how can the details of every single proposal be checked?

[Kiss] I have to return to establishing and adhering to a coordination system. If all interested parties can express their views on a given proposal, then sooner or later it will come to light if it was submitted with ill intentions. Another type of defense is that this kind of issue should not be left without consequences—in other words, deception of the government should have its repercussions.

[Marvanyi] Investigations are being conducted in some of these cases. Will these be completed and the results published, or are we again to expect the usual amnesia that follows changes of leadership—namely no one claims to know anything about the previous events?

[Kiss] Amnesia cannot happen either in making people responsible for their actions or in other areas because most people will remain in their positions at the ministries and in the Prime Minister's Office, too. Therefore, the system of expectations and responsibilities is continuous.

[Marvanyi] Will there be the so-called "3000," namely secret government decisions in the future?

[Kiss] It is basically in the government's competence to decide what form its decisions should take. It is understandable that the government's work will never be as public as that of parliament. However, the range of "3000" decisions can be quite precisely defined in the government's procedures. If decisions affecting the budget reserve or other resources had been made in the form of "3000" decisions then this was an improper practice and has to be changed. This will be possible because, as I have said, the government's procedures will be changed.

[Marvanyi] Recently, everything was not in order regarding the implementation of government decisions. Deadlines expired, but the responsible minister did not care at all.

[Kiss] The observance of deadlines depends on regular and consistent checking. This can be resolved, for example, if the office prepares a note for the prime minister for every single government session on the implementation of tasks that have a deadline. It is also possible that the government only reviews the delays once a month. However, if a minister is regularly late with his tasks, then it is unlikely that he will feel very good at the government sessions.

Industry Minister-Designate Views Tasks

AU2906154994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Jun 94 p 13

[Interview with Laszlo Pal, industry and trade minister-designate, by Antonia Radi; place and date not given]

[Text] The new Industry and Trade Ministry will presumably be based on the Ministry of International Economic Relations [NGKM] and will operate out of Honved Street. We interviewed Socialist minister-designate Laszlo Pal who said he and his Free Democrat state secretary will supplement each other well.

[Radi] Although we have an interregnum at the moment, are you satisfied with the past performance of any of the areas you are preparing to take over, and where are you planning significant changes?

[Pal] As is known, we are talking about a few ministries. The Industry and Trade Ministry [IKM] (with certain exceptions), the current NGKM, and the National Technical Development Committee [OMFB] will come under joint control. Out of these, I am familiar with two organizations: I worked for the OMFB and the IKM for a long time in the past. I have had more than 20 years of regular contact with the foreign trade administration. Therefore, I believe that I will not be a complete stranger in the ministerial chair, and I can say that I consider the NGKM the best as regards its staff and organization. The IKM has been through many traumas in the past years. Even before the change of the regime, the ministry had frequent reorganizations and leadership changes. The ministry's workers felt that they were not the main actors in controlling the economy. In spite of all these disadvantages, the ministry has carried out important work in energy management. However, in connection with the domestic market, I must say that they have not really been able to wind up the illegal trade which by now has become one of the most burning issues in the country.

[Radi] You mentioned that the OMFB will also be under your control. Have you yet decided how it would be possible to organize technical development more efficiently?

[Pal] We still have to think much about the methods. At the moment, it is still an open issue to what extent we should work as an authority and how much say the economic chambers should have in the work. Although only on the level of discussions, it has been suggested, for example, that the OMFB could operate as a foundation.

[Radi] From what you are saying, it can be concluded that you might organize the new ministry on the basis of the NGKM.

[Pal] Our work will definitely have to be based on the organization of the NGKM. This ministry has the smallest number of uncertainties. The coalition agreement that prescribes negotiations with other ministries on dividing the work might be a limit to the new united organization.

[Radi] Therefore, Margit Ring or Honved Street?

[Pal] I have not yet decided but I think that we will probably work in the NGKM's building in Honved Street.

[Radi] The public widely believes that the so-called economic top ministry will be formed by merging the aforementioned ministries. Nevertheless, Laszlo Bekesi is seen as the "top minister."

[Pal] Bekesi will be the leader of the economic cabinet. Accordingly, he will fill the most important economic key position. The Finance Ministry will also perform more functions than before. The longer-term economic issues—for example, the reform of state administration—will definitely be the Finance Ministry's tasks. In addition to this, the finance minister will supervise privatization. Naturally, negotiations—which could, with some exaggeration, be called struggle—are under way.

[Radi] You are a marked personality of the left wing. How will you work together with the liberal Attila Karoly Soos who will presumably be the political state secretary of your ministry?

[Pal] I do not have an orthodox or dogmatic way of thinking. Within the left wing, I have always been in favor of rational solutions. Soos and I have known each other for more than four years. It can be seen that we approach certain issues from a different angle but I could also answer your question by saying that we will supplement each other well. He is a recognized liberal economic policy expert whose main professional areas are the macro economy and financial policy. Gabor Szalay's name was also suggested when the nominations were made. With him, we were able to work together very well in the economic committee. We might have more arguments with Soos. However, this is not a problem.

Poll on Government-Media Relations Detailed

WS3006101594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Article by R.W.: "Public Opinion Research Institute for RZECZPOSPOLITA; Politicians Want Influence, Journalists Independence"]

[Text] The government, president, and other important state establishments should not have privileged access to the mass media; if they are allowed such access, this should only happen in exceptional cases. However, it would not be good if politicians in a democratic state had an influence on the mass media. The Polish press and radio are currently rather independent of the government and the state; television is slightly more susceptible to pressure. These were the answers that were most often supplied by respondents to an opinion poll conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA by the Sopot-based Public Opinion Research Institute.

The issue of relations between politicians and the mass media has been one of the most heatedly discussed topics in recent weeks.

There Was an Attack by Politicians

The focus of their attack was first of all television. There came signals from the Belweder that the activities of the president were not presented properly. Similar complaints were voiced by members of the government; they attempted among other things, to influence the shape of the information presented on the "Wiadomosci" television newscast (the well-known issue of the "strike-related" statement by the prime minister). The head of the Office of the Council of Ministers came up with the idea of quite a large time slot for the government during television's prime time. The most is being said about public television; it is accused of either favoring the government too much, or of presenting too many rightist sympathies. Private media are not spared, either. This especially applies to the press, which politicians accuse of pursuing sensational news and creating "press facts." The proposal by Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] Deputy Adam Halber to establish a Press Council, the work of which would be similar to the work of the National Council of Radio and Television, was interpreted as an attempt to take control over the activities of dailies and periodicals.

Journalists, in turn, accuse politicians of being arrogant, of blocking access to information, of wanting to exert influence over the content of programs, of not respecting the expectations of viewers and readers, of wanting to restore some forms of censorship, and of not seeing the fact that a free market of mass media is being created.

The one that seems to be forgotten in this discussion, that is...

The Viewer and the Voter...

...has real trouble in defining their attitude toward the substance of the dispute. The most-often expressed opinion (34 percent) is that representatives of the state authorities should not have privileged access to the press, radio, or television.

Twenty-eight percent of respondents are willing to give politicians such a right; however, this would be possible only in exceptional situations. For 31 percent, such a privilege is obvious and unconditional, while 7 percent do not have any opinion on this issue.

The views of politicians are relatively often shared by the elderly, people with elementary education, those with low or average incomes, working in state-owned enterprises, unskilled workers, and voters of "Solidarity."

On the other side are young people, educated and well-off people holding high posts, private businessmen, and those who in the last elections supported the "Fatherland" coalition, derived from the Christian-Democratic Union. Supporters of the governing SLD and the Polish Peasant Party do not really want important state authorities to have privileged access to the mass media more than others do.

It turns out, however, that for the ordinary citizen...

...Access and Influence Are Not the Same

Even though we are often ready to resign ourselves to the fact that politicians will present their views through the mass media on special terms, we hate even the thought that politicians might exert influence on the media. A definite majority—69 percent—of respondents believe that, in a democratic state, politicians should not have influence on the press, radio, or television. Only 19 percent would give them such a right, and 12 percent abstained from expressing an opinion.

The principle of media independence is particularly strongly defended by young respondents, people working in the budget sector, mid-level white-collar workers, and parliamentary voters of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the former Democratic Union, the SLD, and the Union of Labor.

Thus, the lifting of censorship and independence of journalists, one of the main demands concerning democratic reforms in Poland, seems to be a generally accepted principle. Many people believe that it has already become possible to implement it. The press and radio receive the best grades: More than 50 percent of respondents think that these are media that are already independent of the government and the state (even though only 13 percent believe they are fully independent). According to respondents, television still leaves a lot to be desired; it is a particularly delicious tidbit for politicians and state officials. Half of all respondents are of the opinion that television is still dependent on the state authorities.

Are the mass media in Poland independent of the government and the state?

(in percent)

	Press	Radio	Television
Independent	53	54	40
Dependent	36	36	50
Hard to tell	11	10	10

* * *

The opinion poll was conducted on 11-12 June on a 1,043-person representative sample of adult Poles.

Government Coalition Policies Attacked

94EP0067A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 22, 29 May 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Leslaw Maleszka: "(Sharp) Curve Ahead for Reforms"]

[Text] The leftist [governing] coalition, made confident by its victory of 19 September, increasingly often behaves as if in disregard of legal norms, treating them as a flexible instrument in the hands of rulers. The Sejm is ready to encroach upon the powers of the ministries of state, whether by appointing a committee for investigating the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or cultivating notions that it should make decisions on the privatization of particular enterprises. The government claims for itself powers of decreeing tax laws (the first version of the law governing wage-increase taxes, in its part concerning taxes on wages paid by private companies). The coalition has even been ready to amend the Constitution in order to resolve a particular dispute with the president.

Doesn't this nonchalant and purely instrumental treatment of law warrant the apprehension that it may also be applied to civic liberties?

It's the Economy, Stupid!

From the very beginning of the Polish reforms, state-owned enterprises have been mounting a "resistance front" against them. If we sum up the list of their demands, we find that the only aspects of the free market to meet with acceptance from the management and work forces of these enterprises are the right to free determination of prices and wages, and, as for everything else relating to the risks of the market game, that should be taken care of by the state.

Until the end of 1993, it was possible not to cross the border beyond which a controlled economy commences. Besides, there had been no way of doing that; in mid-1993, Minister Waclaw Niewiarowski evaluated a proposal for a new program for a so-called activist industrial policy and found that it would require 40 trillion zlotys. No optimist inclined to print such a humongous mass of money has turned up.

For a slew of reasons, the economic reform has been implemented inconsistently from the outset, owing to such factors as economic compulsion (the impossibility of adding to unemployment) and political (lack of support from the parliament) or social (confrontation of strikes) considerations. Implementing some of the programs has been postponed to an indefinite future, and they are to this day waiting to be settled.

Major obstacles have been arising to the liquidation of enterprises with unpromising prospects. In 1989, a program for shutting down four mines in the Walbrzych Basin was adopted, but they continue operating to this day. Similarly, arms plants whose employees continue to receive wages have been standing idle for months. The government tacitly accepts the fact that many enterprises are not settling their tax, loan, and other obligations.

Strikes, a climate of suspicion, and scandals have together contributed to a slowdown of privatization. By the end of 1993, about 2,500 plants—I omit state farms and facilities transferred to municipal ownership—have changed ownership, but the state-owned industrial empire remains huge, consisting of 5,300 firms. There was a dearth of determination and political support for demonopolizing and privatizing the colossi of telecommunications, the tobacco monopoly, the thermoelectric power plants, and the petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries. In these respects, we remain far behind Hungary and the Czech Republic. After four years, it still has not been possible to reform the financing of housing construction, education, health care, and social services. Likewise, public finance still has not been decentralized: Expenditures on local governments still account for about 12 percent of state-budget outlays.

Western observers are wondering whether Poland has yet reached the turning point beyond which there is no return from capitalism. This is an unusually crucial question. There is no doubt that the gears cannot be shifted into reverse; we are not going to return to communism. But still, to quote from Prime Minister's Pawlak's address to the Sejm, the car could be stopped and tentatively turned into some "third road."

"Perhaps Things Can Be Different"

That is what Aleksander Kwasniewski [leader of the Democratic Left Alliance] asserted. Well, precisely!

It appears that the PSL-SLD team [the leftist governing coalition of the Polish Peasant Party and the Democratic Left Alliance] does not have a clear and defined vision of economic policy and that it is not sure which parts of the program should be continued and which altered. From the outset, it was clear that the electoral promises given by these parties concerning social protection could not be kept. It may be that this leftist coalition will pursue a concept of a markedly etatist economy stressing state interventionism. Ideas of this kind had already surfaced in a previous administration, Olszewski's, but by and large were not pursued. Nowadays, however, they may be taken up.

Lately the government has announced mass "commercialization" of state enterprises [their conversion to private ones on condition that the Treasury own a share of 51 percent in them], at the same time abandoning the rule that two years subsequently such enterprises are to be completely privatized. The purpose of this operation is to strengthen supervision by the state as the owner. Thus, there is to arise the institution of the State Treasury, administering industrial assets and controlling them through government officials appointed to supervising boards of plants. This idea of an institutional organization of state-owned assets has probably become a given by now, considering that, in the proposed new government structure developed in Michal Strak's (PSL) cabinet, a portfolio of the minister of the treasury (as head of one of nine economic ministries of state) has already been set aside.

The extent of the powers of the State Treasury is as yet unclear. Pessimists claim that it will be comparable to that of the notorious Central Planning Commission of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. It is certain, at any rate, that these powers will be expanded in the event that state-owned holding companies are organized into subsector structures because then it would be possible to pursue industrial policy by analogy with the former associations and unions.

The idea of the State Treasury as an institution has no precedent in any European Community country except Italy, where a Ministry of State-Owned Holding Companies used to exist. In May 1993, Italians in a referendum supported dissolving that ministry and privatizing the assets of these companies because that institution turned out to be, so to speak, mafiagenic, or dominated by the Mafia.

A Return to a Controlled Economy?

Considering how the politicians of the governing administration speak, a marked expansion of economic protectionism is to be expected. That would include:

—Augmenting plant investments from the state budget (in previous years, such investments were in principle confined to infrastructural ones), expanding government loan guarantees, granting subsidies (to, among other domains, agriculture).

—Restricting imports by raising duties, broadening the licenses for the importation of specific goods.

—Expanding exports at the price of the state budget's becoming a partial guarantor for the risks of domestic exporters and even subsidizing exported goods (sugar).

—Restricting the independence of the National Bank of Poland. There are growing demands for reducing the mandatory reserves, cutting the loan interest rate to the level of "anticipated" inflation and increasing the financing of the budgetary deficit.

Let us try to imagine a country in which all of these policies are consistently pursued. The center is dominated by a mighty government cartel generating the lion's share of national income. On the margins, there survives a feeble capitalism, predominant solely in farming, trade, and services. What is more, it would be a capitalism aspiring for a special, so to speak, "cooperation rent," deriving from cooperation with the state sector—that is, from access to government orders, grants, loans, licenses, tax relief, etc.

Is Poland Menaced by "Italianization"?

The economic consequences would be chiefly a chronic inflation and a budget deficit. Incentives for making state enterprises operate efficiently would be markedly weakened. Access to subsidies and privileges would be decided by the extent of the pressure exerted by plants and subsectors and by bargaining mechanisms. One can be certain that such mechanisms will often have nothing in common with rational economics: Even now, certain plants threaten strikes in the event of refusal of government loan guarantees. In an extreme case, a triumphal return of "quantitative indicators of plan fulfillment" may take place; this does not sound so absurd when we read that, following the recent coal price increases, the Walbrzych mines have again started to operate profitably, for the first time since the Balcerowicz era.

But this will entail political consequences, too, no less menacing than economic ones. Within a short period of time, influential political and economic lobbies will arise. Politicians will buy social peace at workplaces for the price of protection, and ultimately they will also thus buy votes.

They will also buy offices. The [establishment] of the State Treasury as an institution will open the road for the return of the *nomenklatura*, in accordance with the principle that a country belongs to its rulers as their spoil. We have already had a foretaste of this practice during the selection of candidates for members of the supervising councils of the National Investment Funds: The new search committee granted preferences to PRL-era managers.

Government officials employed at the interface between the economy and politics are even now becoming susceptible to persuasion supported by various "arrangements" and gifts. Members of the Farm Market Agency have been driving cars loaned gratis by companies applying for licenses for the import of feeds. Members of the Agricultural Debt Relief and Restructuring Fund deemed it appropriate to grant debt relief also to owners of ice cream and hamburger stalls.

The Mafia Ante Portas?

The dividing line between the rationality of some economic decisions and ordinary corruption is becoming obliterated in an intangible manner. Then the press raises questions that are difficult to answer: Why was an exception made precisely for juniper-flavored vodka

when introducing price increases for alcohol? How much did a gasoline import license cost during the initial, secret period of work of the licensing commission? Did the owners of Art-B sponsor the electoral campaign of certain politicians, and were they, in return, warned of the arrest threatening them? [Art-B was a phony company organized by crooks who mulcted Polish banks of millions of dollars before absconding some two years ago.]

The Italian state was destroyed not by the criminal classes but by so-called cronyism—that is, by a dense spiderweb of ties and interests linking leaders of political parties, officials of the economic administrations, mayors, and leading personages of the world of business. Cronyism bloomed on the fertile soil of state-owned holding companies, economic promotion, and grandiose plans for reducing the disproportions between the rich north and the backward south. It did not necessarily ripen into corruption because it often represented the government's concessions to the pressures of, say, trade unions. But mafia structures sank roots on the peripheries of that system, and, in the end, they began to penetrate the highest state offices.

Cronyism, with all its consequences, including a government ruled by the mafia, is a ceaseless threat to a state organized in an etatist and protectionist manner.

The State on the Auction Block

A democratic state is a forum for the competition and reconciliation of the most varied group interests. On the other hand, the state cannot dispense with the consensus of its citizens on a particular ensemble of values and purposes defined as raison d'etat or overriding social interest.

In Poland, this dilemma has arisen in a quite dramatic manner. On the one hand, the fall of the totalitarian system meant a drastic limitation of state power, and the unwritten "nonaggression pact" between the main political forces collapsed after the first two months of the Mazowiecki government. On the other, it was obvious that the bankruptcy of communism was going to lead to painful consequences in the form of a nearly 30-percent decline in consumption, the unemployment of 2 million, etc.

Exploiting the burdens of the reform as a bidding card in the game for power was bound to result in magnifying conflicts and radicalizing protests. What is worse, it was bound to discourage citizens from participating in public life and identifying themselves with the government. Every third Pole claims nowadays that he does not trust any government agency and rejects all public authorities!

Social Pacts—But No!

Thus, we are standing on the brink of a war of all against all. Awareness of this situation has prompted the idea of social pacts.

In signing the Pact of the State Enterprise, the Suchocka government had hoped to involve trade unions in the economic reforms. Five months later, it was toppled by the NSZZ Solidarity [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity"]. The new government decided to negotiate a pact on social conditions. Solidarity interprets this in its own manner as the right to codetermine the state budget.

The idea of a social pact is risky, to say the least, owing to both tactical and strategic considerations.

The tactical arguments were cited on various occasions by Janusz Lewandowski [former minister of privatization]: A sensible conclusion of a pact requires guarantees that the parties thereto will adhere to it, but, actually, the state's partner in any such pact nowadays is a divided and anarchized trade union movement with political aspirations, which struggles to win popularity among workers by escalating its demands. In many occupations and professions, the only demand is that the privileges gained in the PRL era, the "status quo ante," be guaranteed, that "what was, should be." Lewandowski was right: It has not been possible to reform cooperatives together with their members, the health service together with physicians, and the social security system together with the subsectors benefiting from retirement-pension privileges. Most of the state enterprises sold off through capitalized privatization had to be "bought" or extorted from their work forces.

But what if a social pact fails? The idea of such a pact has been translated into practice on a varying scale, sometimes in the form of a system of subsector bargaining agreements and sometimes through negotiations on the growth rate of consumption, in certain countries of West Europe.

The balance sheet of a corporate state—because that is what the idea of social pacts leads to—does not look encouraging. In the best case, collective bargaining agreements stabilize the economy so long as the boom lasts—and explode when it becomes necessary to bear the burden of recession equitably. This is exemplified by the strike of German metalworkers, which was essentially aimed at the cost of reconstruction of the former GDR. More often, though, corporatism has led to isolation from foreign competition and, as a consequence, to a decline in the GDP growth rate (Austria, Sweden).

The consequences of such a policy proved to be the most painful in Italy, in the form of chronic inflation and steep growth of the budget deficit ($93 billion). This happens when it is incumbent on a government to pay the bill for the agreements negotiated between a confederation of employers and central trade unions.

Those gaining the most from corporatism are the strongest and best-organized subsectors representing traditional branches of industry. The losers are medium and small business, traditionally more innovative and productive. Corporatism promotes an economy dominated by monopolies and a stronger standing of state-owned

companies. Under corporatism, any attempt at reforming the public sector encounters strong resistance from the trade unions, threatening the fall of the government.

In a situation in which a most important economic decision—namely, how to distribute national income—is outside the powers of the government and becomes the object of an agreement between trade union and managerial lobbies, the idea of the "common good" acquires a different interpretation in public awareness as well. The dominant belief that arises is that the government is an alien or even a hostile body from which benefits and privileges have to be extorted. Sociologists point out that one reason for the Italian crisis has been the unusually low—compared with West Europe as a whole—extent to which Italians identify themselves with the institutions and laws of their country.

Can We Afford Corporatism?

This is the fundamental question today. Doesn't the idea of the social pact conflict with the goal of accelerating economic growth and increasing investment at the price of slowing down the growth of consumption?

Would it not be better if, without infringing on civil liberties, a policy capable of confrontation with strikes were to be pursued, upon consistently arguing that, in the long run, they do not pay for work forces? Would it not be better for the political elites to be willing to risk their own popularity so long as the country made progress?

A social pact makes sense only if the parties to it agree to share not only power and prerogatives but also responsibilities and risks. An opportunity for such a pact had been the attempt, undertaken in the last months of the Suchocka administration, to reform the system of public administration. It was decided to transfer quite a few administrative functions to local governments upon providing them with the financial wherewithal but, at the same time, bidding them to cope on their own with unnecessary spending and, for example, excessive costs of operating health care-institutions. This would be a worthwhile experiment for yet another reason: As demonstrated by sociological surveys, Poles nowadays identify themselves more strongly with their local governments than with "Warsaw." Local governments may prove a pretty good school of national thinking.

Doomsday Scenarios

But these are theoretical reflections. It is likely that, in Poland, the future belongs to corporatism because that "ism" thrives in an etatist-protectionist economy. "Trade-unioncracy" and state interventionism have common ideological roots, close to those of the current governing coalition.

Supporters of an "activist" economic policy of the government are prone to refer to the experience of the countries of Southeast Asia. They do not want to bear in mind a couple of things—namely, that the Asian "tigers" are, almost without exception, governed in a dictatorial manner. Labor relations over there are of a paternalist-feudalist nature, with trade unions being banned.

In Poland, unfortunately, a Latin-American "model" seems much more likely.

In the 1950's and 1960's, it had seemed that the countries of Latin America were stuck in a vicious circle: Governments of the military juntas were followed by democratization, and, in the free elections, the most populist presidential candidate would win. He then raised wages and distributed lavish social entitlements, smothering business to death with taxes as well as with bribes for government officials. After a couple of years, a country would be mired in hyperinflation, unemployment, corruption, and terrorism. Thereupon, the junta would again seize power. Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile was an exception because, as a rule, once the colonels tackled reforming the economy "on their own," this would result in economic nationalism, takeovers of foreign enterprises, duties, and grandiose inefficient investments (the superhighway across the Amazon River jungle...). This model, too, was bound to be disastrous, and, hence, in a couple of years, the circle began all over again, with democratization and electoral competition among populist candidates.

As late as in the 1970's, many scholarly volumes were published, arguing that "classical" capitalism is impossible in Latin America. Fortunately, the Latins did not listen to the "third way" ["neither capitalism nor socialism"] theoreticians, and, since the late 1970's, one Latin American country after another has been choosing a market economy along with democracy; the doors to foreign capital were opened, a struggle against inflation was undertaken, and state-owned companies were privatized. Nowadays, the gross domestic product of Latin American countries is growing at an annual rate of 3-4 percent, overall.

The Italian Road, the Greek Road

Of special importance to these reflections are Italy and Greece because, in these countries, the economy and governance were mismanaged in democratic conditions.

Italy or "Tangentopolis" (meaning Corruption City) has received considerable attention from the press in the past two years. It is thus worth noting the consequences of the "revolution of clean hands": the bankruptcy of the traditional political class, the abolition of the Ministry for Holding Companies, an aggressive privatization of state enterprises and banks, the firing and not infrequent indictments of the managers of state companies who were appointed to their positions through political cronyism, and the drafting of a law ordering open bidding for public investments and banning partnership between state and private capital in joint projects. In Rome, the victorious device was that the sole remedy for "kleptocracy" (government by thieves) is the liberalization of government structures.

On the other hand, that device lost out in Greece following the victory of socialists from the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] party. The case of Athens is worth noting, considering that, after a couple of years of "activist economic policy," Poland may become in many respects like Greece. And, anyway, can't we notice the resemblance even now? In Greece, country of 10 million, two-thirds of the population are employed in small family establishments and farming, but as many as 850,000 work in the state sector. Even so, a kind of rachitic capitalism is thriving there, owing to an underground economy that generates 30-40 percent of national income. It is the general custom of citizens and companies to boycott taxes.

In 1990, Greece was shaken by the Bank of Crete scandal: That bank, which funded the ruling PASOK party and executed government contracts, embezzled funds from its depositors, spending them on illegal financial dealings. The scandal entangled the president and several ministers. Yet, four years later, PASOK returned to power because populism won, the reason being that the previous rightist Mitsotakis government tried to cope with an ailing economy: with double-digit inflation, a budget deficit greater by 30 percent than Treasury receipts, a bloated bureaucracy, and a public sector causing a growing deficit. PASOK proclaimed preserving social entitlements, greater prosperity, and nationalist slogans, referring to the obsessions relating to European integration, and it won.

* * *

And the leftist parties won in Poland. All that remains is to repeat the wish addressed to the victors by Leszek Balcerowicz: It would be better for them to deceive the voters than to keep all the promises they made during the electoral campaign.

Pawlak on Rural Development, Minority Issues

PM2906131494 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 18-19 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by correspondent Szczepan Lawniczak; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lawniczak] Prime Minister, you recently paid a visit to Germany. Did your talks with German politicians touch again on the question of why the German side has to date failed to respect those provisions of the Treaty of Good-Neighbor Relations Between Poland and Germany, which concern the undertaking to accord equal civil rights to the Polish national minority in Germany, whereas our side has fulfilled our respective obligations toward the German minority? German internal legislation still does not recognize the concept of national minority in the official sense, with all of the legal consequences that entails.

[Pawlak] We did indeed have talks on this subject, and there were assurances from the German side that they would also address this question within the framework of our mutual relations and that it would be dealt with on the principle of parity. But here I would have you note that, on our part, no such action was taken before, either by the government that signed the treaty with the Germans or by the successive government teams preceding the present one. I would like to take a slightly broader view of this problem. I believe that, at this precise moment, in the political situation we face in Europe, it is imperative that equality of each country's political, economic, and national interests must be scrupulously respected in mutual relations between individual states. However, we need a whole infrastructure to secure this equality. Take, for example, the International Poznan Fair, where you can see only too clearly how essential it is that we arrive at good, partnerlike relations in the sphere of economic concerns. This requires that each partner come up with many initiatives. Here in Poland an important challenge in the sphere of foreign economic relations is to rearrange our banking and insurance systems and also to pay special attention to building up our credibility and avoiding involvement in any preferential business contracts. Germany is for us a significant trading partner. This was discussed in more detail during a press conference given by Minister Leon Podkanski, head of the foreign economic cooperation department. However, we believe that there is still much potential for expanding the sphere of our economic cooperation. Germany is situated right across the path that will lead us into the European Union [EU].

[Lawniczak] The ink is barely dry on the pages of the new Sejm Act on the Food Economy Bank [BGZ]. What practical consequences of this act will follow in the present procurement season for the agricultural and food industries that, because of the large debts they owe to the BGZ, debts for which they cannot always be blamed, have lost their liquidity and, consequently, their creditworthiness?

[Pawlak] The BGZ, together with the whole network of cooperative banks, corresponds in its structure to the structure of the German Volksbanks or their French counterparts. So there is actually no need for dismantling it; on the other hand, it is vitally necessary to strengthen that whole network from the organizational, substantive, and financial viewpoint. It is precisely that banking structure that supports the major proportion of our agricultural and food industry. The passing of the Sejm Act on the BGZ bodes well for these industries. However, I would like to stress that there are well-justified fears that, in the present procurement season, the act will not yet bring appreciable effects as far as the food-processing sector is concerned. However, the government has launched other, additional initiatives in order to ensure that enterprises within such industries, such as the Hortex food manufacturers, food-freezing plants, cold stores, and food-processing plants, do not lose out this season. From what I know, similar initiatives have been activated by the Sejm Agriculture and Food Economy Commission. It is to be regretted that work on

the Sejm act lasted so long. Moreover, I believe that our organizational and financial structures are not at present sufficiently prepared to service that sector effectively. Nor are they ready to service agriculture or the wider band of industries auxiliary to the agricultural sector. The most important factor for effective development of the agricultural sector will be organization of its supporting infrastructure—that is, the whole technological, organizational, and substantive backup facilities that influence the development of agriculture proper.

This is why we stress in the so-called "Strategy for Poland" program that we will want to seek development potential for whole rural areas, to take the best possible advantage of the many opportunities the rural sector offers, and to expand them by improving not only its purely technological infrastructure but also the surrounding networks of commercial and service outlets. Here it is important to apply the principle of expanding the returns from extraagricultural activities within the overall category of rural revenues. This will serve to strengthen the rural sector's economy.

[Lawniczak] Prime Minister, the document "Strategy for Poland" carries the following statement in the second paragraph on the first page: "The center-left government proposes a new approach to the problems that trouble our society." Unless I am mistaken, this is the first time the government coalition has admitted in an official document that it adheres to the center-left orientation. So how much "center" is there in the government, and how much "left"?

[Pawlak] This can, of course, be determined according to tests applied by many university professors, who, it is to be expected, will take many years before they publish the results of their exact measurements of how much "center" there was in this government and how much "left." On the other hand, our voters will judge us not according to such subtle differentiations but according to the results we produce. I think it is important here that we draw conclusions from our experience to date and remember that, in addition to quoting economic statistics referring to inflation, the budget deficit, and so on, there are fundamental indicators determining the condition of the country and its people such as, for example, the millions of unemployed, or the low living standards and low incomes of a considerable number of citizens. Consequently, we must strive to preserve not only economic but also social equilibrium so that we can give an affirmative answer to the question whether our living standard is better now than it was a year ago. If we can indeed state that we do live a better life today, this will provide a starting point for an internal stability and constitute a solid basis from which to develop.

[Lawniczak] We now have a season of business fairs and exhibitions. They represent a wide range of standards and achievements. You, Prime Minister, have attended and will yet attend many of these events, including those organized at local levels. How do you rate their usefulness?

[Pawlak] I believe that they serve a purpose, and the chief measure of that sense is the degree to which these local initiatives can promote local communities and, even more important, whether, as a result of these fairs and exhibitions, the latter can boast results calculated according to the fundamental market indicator: revenues from the sales of goods and services. If they are successful in this, I see no reason that we should marginalize even the most modest of their initiatives. Let me just remind you that quite recently I attended a business fair in the rather small city of Swarzedz, which, notwithstanding its insignificant size, has over many years—in fact, a few centuries—developed into an important furniture-manufacturing center. Its industry is by now a significant contributor to the national economy, and its craftsmen have created a rich furniture-making tradition that goes back for generations and supports a number of contributing industries, as well. I have nothing against seeing more centers like that developing in our country, even if their beginnings are seemingly quite modest. In any case, such centers provide the best stimuli that can successfully galvanize not only local communities but also local self-government initiatives and structures—which will be soon be set up as a result of the forthcoming local elections.

There is one other aspect of this question. I have mentioned the importance of developing our rural communities. This development, coupled with the rise of local initiatives, allows us to set up modern-technology industries in rural communities. We already have examples of such centers operating in the so-called rural backwater areas. A modern hypodermic syringe factory has been built near Lomza, and there are computer-manufacturing plants in the Nowy Sacz region. We could begin as soon as possible to set up such new enterprises in many areas of our country, in places that are often remote and forgotten, so that they can present examples of entrepreneurial spirit to many potential entrepreneurs. And the fundamental question here is to find people who can make use of these new chances, who can "prospect for the gold, find it, and mine it."

[Lawniczak] Thank you for talking with us.

Gdynia 'Europartenariat' Meeting Assessed

PM3006084694 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 21 Jun 94 pp 3, 6

[Article by Andrzej Mach: "A Chance for Small Business"]

[Text] The name itself is quite involved: Europartenariat. The event thus named took place in Gdynia with the participation of 450 Polish and approximately 1,500 foreign companies. Representatives of our region were also there: the Institute of Heavy Organic Synthesis, Frigoopol, the Odra confectionery factory, and Ozamech.

The Europartenariat is neither an institution nor a one-off event. It is a long-term program devised by the European Union [EU] to last for many years. To date, there have already been 10 Europartenariat meetings, in which almost 12,500 companies took part. The Europartenariat

was set up mainly for the smaller and medium-size companies because the program was devised with the specific objective of promoting these categories of economic units. It is worth emphasizing that Poland was the first country from outside the European Twelve that was entrusted with the task of organizing a Europartenariat meeting. The rival candidate was Spain's Bilbao. According to an opinion voiced by von Moltke, a high-ranking EU representative, the reason this year's meeting was organized in our country was "the activity and the development of smaller and medium-size business enterprises, and also, obviously, the fact that Poland records the highest economic growth in its part of Europe." On the basis of the experience gained from earlier meetings of this "European Partnership" scheme, which took place, in among other places, in Dublin, Thessaloniki, Bari, Oporto, and Leipzig, we can say that this EU initiative brings more tangible effects than most such traditionally celebrated events as international business fairs. Although, as Marek Grabowski observes in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, "no business contracts are negotiated or signed within the framework of this event," there are nonetheless many useful consultations organized during the meeting, and businessmen make new contacts that will eventually bear fruit in the form of long-term exchange of information and experience, technical and economic cooperation, and so on.

As Jozef Kasperek, the deputy voivoda of Opole who attended this year's Europartenariat meeting, told us, its participants showed considerable interest in Poland, and that included interest in the companies representing the Opole region. Will we see any tangible advantages following from this interest? According to Deputy Voivoda Kasperek, this will depend to a large extent on the terms of cooperation we offer to our potential foreign partners.

Our own observation and the opinions gleaned from Opole businessmen yield two significant conclusions. The first is that, if we think seriously of attracting foreign capital to Poland on an appreciable scale, we must first create the appropriate legislative framework to cope with the necessary formalities. The second conclusion is that, contrary to what certain homegrown parliament members and politicians assert, there is simply no sufficient domestic capital in Poland at the present moment. After his return from Gdynia, Deputy Voivoda Kasperek told us: "Representatives of the EU as well as businessmen representing companies from EU member countries told us repeatedly on every occasion, both in private talks and during official meetings with the official Polish state delegation, that they will invest in Poland only when it is to their own financial advantage. This manifest truth should be repeated at every opportunity throughout our country because the Europartenariat meeting has confirmed for us yet again that no one is prepared to spend even a single ECU here out of pure sympathy for Poland."

Will the Gdynia meeting bring some appreciable results for the economy of our whole region? It is definitely too early to formulate an answer to this question. Apart from enterprises representing our industry and science at the Europartenariat event, there was also the Opole Region Development Agency, headed by its chairman, Wieslaw Wroblewski. This agency demonstrated much dynamic initiative in actively promoting our region in the coastal area. The companies that took part in the Europartenariat meeting are moderately optimistic about its expected results for their own enterprises. Delegates who visited Gdynia's Nautia shipyard, which hosted the Europartenariat events, maintain that there are indeed serious hopes of gaining new partners for regular cooperation within EU countries, and also in countries that are scheduled to join the EU in the near future (such as, among others, Sweden), but they still agree with everything Voivoda Kasperek has said to us.

Nevertheless, the Europartenariat does create a major chance for our economy as a whole. This is what Anna Dunin-Wasowicz has to say about it in an article published by that eminently competent periodical GAZETA BANKOWA: "The solutions applied by smaller and medium-size firms will eventually transform the whole traditional structure of Polish industry. As a result, the scale of commercial conflict between Poland and the European Union will decrease significantly."

The above conclusions illustrate well the light in which we should predominantly view the significance of the fact that the Europartenariat '94 was organized in Poland. The event gave rise to a degree of local excitement generated by the rivalry between Gdansk and Gdynia over the proposed venue for the meeting. However, these were but peripheral considerations, even if some of the media blew them up to major proportions and gave them foreground exposure. But the most significant result, according to government delegates and business representatives alike, was the number of meetings and business talks—9,200 in all—in which Polish companies were partners. The effect of these talks will depend to a great extent on how serious and consistent Polish industrialists and businessmen prove to be in future dealings with their potential partners.

Economic Panel Formed To Monitor Reforms

WS2906120294 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 29 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by K.S.: "'Strategy for Poland' Council; Government Is Hoping for Enlightened Economists"]

[Text] *Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has presented nominations for members of a new Council for Social and Economic Strategy. Professor Jan Mujzel became the council's chairman. He described it as an autonomous agency acting for the sake of systemwide transformations. The council will decide for itself what it will be dealing with, while its expert opinions will be submitted in their entirety not only to the government but also to the public at large. The issue is primarily about strategies and not about immediate economic problems.*

Jan Mujzel admitted that a significant number of leading Polish economists stayed out of the council. Some were

afraid that they would have to basically applaud whatever Deputy Prime Minister Gregorz Kolodko says or does, while some others, being discouraged by the rush that was effected in the process of the council's establishment, chose to wait for its program of activities to be defined.

Grzegorz Kolodko did not deny that the state's Strategy for Poland program may be the center of attention for experts sitting on the council, primarily regarding the direction of development and its context. The government is eager to have the time frame for the Strategy extended and also to protect the economic infrastructure against the impact of political maneuvering or games. So one cannot say that the council for the Strategy is linked to only one political orientation or to a specific coalition. Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak also pointed to some predecessors of the current council, such as the council headed by Professor Czeslaw Bobrowski after 1956 or a subsequent advisory body chaired by Professor Witold Trzeciakowski that operated in more recent history. The government is not afraid of pointed judgments or critical conclusions that might be made by members of the current council because the government is of the view that making economic debates and various arguments and points of view more dynamic will contribute to a decrease in the social cost of development and will also simply contribute to improved efficiency.

The council is completely sovereign when it comes to its composition. If it deems necessary, it can expand the list of members to include representatives of the social sciences. The guarantee of complete openness in debates as well as the possibility of publishing minutes from the debates and professional opinions is supposed to enrich the overall debate on issues crucial to the future. Grzegorz Kolodko would be interested in getting answers to questions such as: What is the relationship between the Strategy and the contemporary world's challenges in the field of technology? How should the goal of transformations be defined? And, as one of the participants noted, what kind of capitalism is this supposed to be anyway?

The government ministers in charge of economic ministries, as well as the prime minister and the deputy prime minister, listened to the debate at the council's first session.

Growth of Foreign Investment, Capital Development

WS3006085594 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 30 Jun 94 p 23

[Article by RYCH: "They Are Already Here; Foreign Investments"]

[Text] *The Germans have so far established the largest number of foreign-capital partnerships in Poland (estimated at over 3,000 partnerships), but the Americans are the first on the list when it comes to the largest investors, while, if the size of investment obligations were also taken into account, the Italians would occupy first place.*

The total value of foreign investments is about $8 billion, out of which, slightly over half consist of confirmed investment obligations. Since 1992, a flow of capital in the range of about $1.5 billion per year has been reported, with a slight growth trend. About 70 percent of all investment is made by large firms.

The largest number of partnerships (about 1,800) was established in Warsaw Voivodship, whereas in the Poznan, Katowice, Krakow, and Gdansk Voivodships, the number of partnerships established ranges from several to a dozen or so times less that in Warsaw Voivodship. Foreign investors are the least interested in areas that have not been sufficiently urbanized (Biala-Podlaska, Przemysl, Chelm, and Lomza Voivodships); in those areas, the number of partnerships is between one and five.

From among the different industrial branches, the electromachine, food, and fuel/energy industries have attracted the largest numbers of foreign investors. There is also investor interest in telecommunications and in the financial sector. Agriculture is the sector with the smallest number of firms investing foreign capital.

Servicing foreign investors is done by, among others, the State Agency for Foreign Investments [PAIZ]. It offers a full range of assistance, from information concerning economic laws to how to seek out partners to implementing investment projects. The agency is particularly interested in those investors that want to implement projects worth over $1 million. A Foreign Investor Club has been established at PAIZ's initiative; it deals with articulating the interests of its members vis-a-vis the Polish authorities.

PAIZ employees intend to work out a collective document containing the principles and procedures applied in foreign investments in Poland. After it is approved by the government, the document would become binding on state administrative organs in their dealings with foreign entrepreneurs.

New Polish-Slovak Border Crossing Opened

LD2906170494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1355 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Nowy Sacz, 29 Jun—A new border crossing between Poland and Slovakia at Konieczna (Nowy Sacz Province) was opened today by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko and Mikulas Dzurinda, Slovak minister of transport and communication. This is the sixth Polish-Slovak road border crossing in Nowy Sacz Province. [passage omitted]

Ireneusz Sekula, chairman of the Main Customs Office, told a PAP journalist that, with effect from 1 July, the regulation on 70,000-zloty payment by each Slovak tourist entering Poland by coach will be abolished. It should expand Polish-Slovak tourism.

Officials View Importance of Censure Motion

AU2906112794 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 24 Jun 94 p 3

[Report by Roxana Badralexi, Corneliu Antim, and Ana-Maria Vintan on statements by four party leaders: Ion Diaconu of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, Victor Surdu of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, Gyorgy Tokay of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, and Adrian Severin of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front), on the opposition's censure motion against the Vacaroiu government: "A Major Political Test of the Opposition Forces"]

[Text] Maybe currently, more important than the illegal acts committed by the executive, the opportunist-conservative orientation of the ruling party, or the genuine-communist vocation of President Iliescu, is the chance for the much-tried unity of the opposition to take a major test, something without precedent in the past four years. We can only speculate whether this means political difference or lack of psychological, egotistical, or ethnic accord. Apparently there are at least four noteworthy "delicate subjects" that we can mention here:

The UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], which has noticed that some of its political partners did not grant it the expected support in the debates on the education law..

The PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], which claims that the procedures of suspending the president should coincide with the registration of the censure motion against the government.

The PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], which surprised the government party because, for the first time, it did not stop at throwing meaningless words and launching threats, but proceeded to real action.

The PD(FSN) [Democratic Party (National Salvation Front)], which, just until recently, undertook the task of editing many such opposition actions, looked for a new means of political compromise.

Therefore, we turned to some of the leaders of these political formations with the following questions:

1. What are the political reasons that made you support the censure motion of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]?

2. Do you believe that it is necessary to proceed to the act of suspending President Iliescu within the same political context?

PNTCD Vice President Ion Diaconu: Either Both of Them Will Succeed or Neither of Them

1. One cannot talk here about setting conditions, but, in any event, the first issue was to suspend the president. Therefore, I expressed my belief that it is better to keep a certain order. Thus, I requested that first of all this decision regarding the suspension of the president should be signed and then we should proceed to the second decision. We decided to keep this order for our planned actions.

2. Under normal circumstances the two actions should not be interdependent. We even mentioned that we would prefer to proceed only to the act of suspending the president. But, considering that other colleagues insisted on submitting a motion, we did not oppose it and signed the motion. However, I wish to repeat, we believe that the claim to have the president suspended is more topical. However, we believe that either both of them will succeed or none of them.

Victor Surdu (PDAR): We Set a Condition to the Motion

1. As on every political stage, where opinions are expressed in a mature manner, naturally the PDAR has waited courteously for the response of the parties that have assumed the responsibility of starting the procedures for the censure motion against the government. The condition that we set to this procedure was that the text of the motion, among other reasons indicated, should also include certain specific issues connected to our party's goals. Eventually, we joined this initiative—which belonged to us in its initial stage—because of the special position of the PDAR in this context, namely that we do not belong to the parliamentary opposition group.

2. We have also made public the position of the PDAR in this respect on several occasions. We believe that the action of suspending the president is untimely because in their appeal on this issue, the opposition forces speak about "respect" for the law and not about "violation" of it, as it should normally have been formulated in order to start such a type of action without any risks.

Gyorgy Tokay (UDMR): Each Person Votes As His Conscience Dictates

1. One cannot talk about setting conditions here. The motion is a political measure and no condition can be set to it. We have reached an agreement and we are going to respect it. Indeed, we discussed these issues within the UDMR. However, there is a big difference between discussing the effectiveness of certain measures and setting conditions. We decided that each parliamentarian representing our party should sign the motion as his conscience dictates. There are some UDMR parliamentarians who are upset, but their feelings have an emotional quality that has nothing to do with politics.

2. As far as your second question is concerned, the resolute nature of the initiative to suspend the president is perfectly justified. In this respect, again each person will vote as his conscience dictates.

(editor's note) On the other hand, Konya Hamar, secretary of the Chamber of Deputies, told us that the indignation of the UDMR members is justified because

in the Commission for Education certain CDR representatives voted against the amendments to the education law suggested by them.

Adrian Severin (PD-FSN): The Motion Attempts To Improve the Government-Parliament Dialogue

1. The issue on which we are currently concentrating is the dialogue between the government and the parliament, which has become impossible. Parliamentarians go through the usual motions (interpellations, queries, briefing) without receiving the expected answers, either because of the unimportant nature of the question or simply because those who are expected to give answers are not present. We find out about the "great" initiatives and actions of the Vacaroiu team from television or other mass media and, usually, they have a purely propagandistic character.

Therefore, we reached the conclusion that the only way to bring Mr. Vacaroiu to the parliament, in order to see what the executive's "concerns" are in connection with the state of the nation, is the censure motion. We would like the text of this motion to be as consistent as possible and well edited, because there are quite enough reasons to justify it.

2. Together with the other opposition parties, the PD(FSN) signed a letter in which the president of the country is invited to explain his views (if he has any) regarding his constitutional tasks. As for us, we are still waiting for a conclusive answer. According to what this answer is, we will decide on our future attitude. In conclusion, we do not see a necessary connection between the censure motion and the president's reaction to the claims of the opposition.

Iliescu Advisers Accused of 'Anti-Nastase Plot'

94P2O903A Bucharest EUROPA in Romanian Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Ilie Neacsu: "Adrian Nastase's Fault: He Rose Too Rapidly"]

[Text] The December 1989 events fundamentally changed all the structures of the Romanian socialist state. People were changed, along with the structures. Especially valuable cadres were replaced by worthless, unexperienced representatives. The only merit of some exponents of the "new revolutionary wave" was the fact that they were out on the streets on 21 and 22 December. Of course, in this case, I am speaking about the naive people who dared to confront military cordons and tanks and not about the actors in the Western scenario aiming at the destabilization and disintegration of Romania.

The revolutionaries on the streets were rapidly marginalized by the new authorities who officially assumed power and consolidated power by two free elections.

The demolition group which installed itself in the Palace [prime minister's office] on Calea Victoriei, headed by Petre Roman and Gelu Voican Voiculescu, was rapidly swept away from the political scene for inability and incompetence. The National Salvation Front split up and a new political grouping appeared, which was first called the Democratic National Salvation Front and then the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]. A group of realistic and well-balanced young politicians directs the fate of this new party: Adrian Nastase, Vasile Vacaru, Ioan Solcanu, Mihai Paslaru, Ioan Doru Taracila, etc.

The new seed bed for politicians has been and remains in the care of Cotroceni [president's office]. After escaping from the hothouse atmosphere, the new shoots of the PDSR grew and developed in a nonuniform manner, causing a nuisance for presidential analysts. On the agenda in Romania there are diversions and scenarios with three kernels of truth out of 100. The most intelligent party chairman of the more than 200 who occupy such a position has been attacked from many different directions. I am referring to Adrian Nastase, and I believe that the attacks against this young politician—with no proof that he had any connections with homosexual milieus—are for only one reason: Adrian Nastase rose too rapidly, according to the calculations of the Cotroceni counsellors.

Whether they admit it or not, the president's advisers are the originators of the anti-Nastase plot. They know perfectly well the danger which he represents for their master. Of course, no one will admit that there is a plot against Adrian Nastase. But, for those who understand maneuvers, there is a red thread running through this. I would not go so far as to believe that the mediocrities around President Ion Iliescu want Adrian Nastase's head at any price but their purpose is to moderate the peppery PDSR leader who has grown in one year as much as the others have grown in 20.

Some confreres are trying to blame the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] since they have become accustomed to denigrating the institution headed by Virgil Magureanu whenever anything happened. I doubt that an intelligent person, such as the head of the SRI, can oppose the rise of a young man who gives true promise of becoming a great politician. I repeat, the only doubts that I have about the personality of Adrian Nastase are connected with the rumors that he flirted with homosexual circles in the past. But in this case, Adrian Nastase must understand that the most intelligent thing that he could do is to withdraw from political life and from public functions. If, however, all these things remain pure rumor, then the SRI has the obligation to support Adrian Nastase in occupying the position which he deserves.

The entire country sees him as a balanced, intelligent, self-assured, spontaneous, educated, and patriotic leader. During a duel with the representatives of the opposition, Adrian Nastase has outclassed his partners in the dialogue, often making them look ridiculous. The

fine humor with which he crushes his political adversaries demonstrates that the PDSR leader is a person with a vast culture and with a broad range of positive ideas. For the unity of the PDSR, it is vital to keep Adrian Nastase at the head of the executive organ of this party. A possible divorce between Nastase and the PDSR would be fatal to the ruling party, just as the departure of Tudor Mohora from the Socialist Workers Party would bury alive this political group.

The Cotroceni analysts cannot ignore the role of personalities in history, especially since their current master, otherwise an intelligent man, is knocking himself out to keep his position as president. As a repeater in the practical tests of political-cultural and socioeconomic life, President Iliescu would be able to withdraw without torches and tom-toms, without glory, but with safety. If he runs for a parliament post in the coming elections, the current president of Romania could become the head of one of the two chambers and, perhaps, a real leader of the Left. We would forgive him for the humiliation to which he subjected all of us because of his exaggeratedly friendly relations with the Jewish clique and with Moses Rosen, may he rest in peace, to the detriment of the majority population and of Romanian dignity. In addition, the change would lead to the burial of the Democratic Convention, in Catholic style.

Agrarian Party Head Calls For Early Elections

94BA0278a Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 12 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Victor Surdu, chairman of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, by Gabriela Tranciuc Neacsu; place and date not given]

[Text] [Neacsu] The PDAR (Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania) claims to be engaged in a full electoral campaign, in contrast with other political organizations which do not have the strength to recognize this action. What does Party Chairman Victor Surdu do in such a situation?

[Surdu] During the past two months we have held a number of consultations (we have another two county centers to go and then we are done) in accordance with our statute, using a five-point agenda: the population's reaction to the decisions of our extraordinary congress; the situation in agriculture, a strongly debated topic; the PDAR's collaboration with the governing party; our activity within the National Unity Bloc; and our collaboration with parties represented locally, in county commissions, in the permanent delegation, as well as in local, communal, and city councils, because we have many mayors. We also discussed the establishment of the "Albina" Credit Bank.

On 1 June we will hold our general assembly in Sibiu, where the bank was located during the interwar period; almost all the required invested and subscribed capital has been obtained. In general, we traveled to these places to listen to the people, and to see how they interpret the policies set at the headquarters in Botosani, Arad, Timisoara, and Tulcea. Our recent position is the result of these meetings.

[Neacsu] During these travels, did you determine that there is a desire—on the local level—for early elections?

[Surdu] The people are fed up with what's happening. In fact, they want early elections; beginning with agriculture and ending with cultural activities, they all feel the same lack of coherence, resolution, progress. The people at the bottom are desperate because they are having an exceptionally hard time. They want early elections on the grounds that only an election will bring about a reassessment of the voters' options, and on the basis of the results, whatever they may be, will result in a political slate that better reflects reality. The respective parties must review their programs, update them, and enter into a political contract that will lead to a governing program based on the political will of parties which assume responsibility for governing.

For the time being, the governing is being done by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], with support from here and there, and the necessary compatibility does not exist even among ourselves—those who until yesterday formed the pentagon [coalition made up of the PDSR, PDAR, the Romanian National Unity Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Greater Romania Party]. The views voiced by some politicians, that the people don't want early elections, are false.

[Neacsu] How do you think the next elections should be carried out?

[Surdu] We want to have the election law changed so that it will present not only party lists but also names, so that the voters will also see the quality of the candidates.

[Neacsu] Can you predict the date of the next elections? When do you think it would possible?

[Surdu] Despite the criticism being voiced, I think that the budget will be passed. The necessary majority will be found with or without us. Early elections will be organized only if Parliament or the president wants them.

The irony is that if they don't take place as soon as possible, the PDSR, despite its majority, stands to lose more with elections in the coming spring or fall. Right now it can afford to undergo some losses, but later I don't know whether it will still have enough left to lose. In other words, the sooner the better. Especially for the government.

Accident at Heavy Water Factory Leaves 4 Dead

AU2906191994 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 25 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Gh. Tiganele: "Tragedy at Halanga Heavy Water Factory; Four People Dead and 10 Comatose"]

[Text] A serious accident occurred at the Heavy Water Factory of Halanga at approximately 2045 [1745 GMT] on the evening of 23 June 1994. Four people have died—one of them is a soldier who was guarding the premises—and another 10 people are comatose. Three people who were driving on the highway close to the factory were also affected. An investigation commission arrived at the factory later that night. After the initial investigations, experts reached the conclusion that the accident was provoked by the collapse of the electrical system, which made the installation for purification of chemically impure water escape control and, at the same time, assimilate the hydrogen sulphide. The dangerous gas greatly exceeded the allowed maximum quota and thus dispersed in the area.

According to locals, the massive hydrogen sulphide seep was felt also in Drobeta Turnu Severin, a town with over 100,000 inhabitants. One year ago three people died in Halanga and less serious accidents subsequently continued to occur. While the investigation is under way, we will continue to report on this syndrome, which innocent people in this area are forced to live with.

Regulations for Parliamentary Debates Adopted

94BA0278B Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian 1 Apr 94 pp 1-2

["Senate Decision Regarding Parliamentary Debate Regulations," issued in Bucharest on 23 March]

[Text]

Senate Decision Regarding Parliamentary Debate Regulations

To establish a civilized climate and increase the effectiveness of debates, inspired by the "Rules for Civilized Debate" established by Oxford University in 1890, and based on its own regulations, on parliamentary practice and usage, and on the Constitution,

The Senate adopts the present Decision regarding the following regulations for parliamentary debates:

Article 1. In political and legislative debates, in interpellations or questions, as well as on any other speaking occasion, the political orientation of other speakers, the right to opinion, and the solemnity of the session will be respected out of mutual consideration and in the spirit of proper national tradition.

Article 2. In any debates, the discussion must be limited to information and arguments specific to the resolution of the question being debated.

Article 3. In the spirit of their own ideologies, the parties in a debate are entitled to use as arguments scientific theories, facts, or data that is apt to clarify the question being discussed.

Article 4. Neither of the parties has the right to bring into discussion as argument or in an insulting manner the character, temperament, physical appearance, personal past, nationality, or ethnic origin of the opponent, since these do not refute nor confirm the validity of the issues being sustained.

Article 5. Parties do not have the right to bring into discussion the motives for an opponent's attitude and opinion, since it causes the discussion to digress from the actual question.

Article 6. Insulting qualifications of opponents by referring to their views or intellect, social class or category, profession or professional training, or social organization or party to which they belong, violates debate regulations and demonstrates an absence of arguments or ability to convince, as well as a lack of respect for the other party.

Article 7. Only arguments and their value count in any debate conducted in a civilized manner. Opinions being expressed are supported only by the basis of the arguments and their ability to convince, and not by the ideology in the name of which the viewpoint is addressed.

Article 8. The president of the Senate or the session president has the obligation to apply the sanctions stipulated in the Senate Regulations when senators violate the rules specified in the preceding articles.

The present Decision was adopted by the Senate at its session of 23 March 1994, with a vote of the majority of the senators, in accordance with the provisions of Article 74, Paragraph 1 of Romania's Constitution.
Senate President Prof. Oliviu Gherman
Bucharest, 23 March 1994 No. 10

ΩIncreasing Suicides Among Military Conscripts

94P20895A

[Editorial Report] On 24 March TINERETUL LIBER, the Bucharest youth daily headed by Ion Cristoiu, who is also the director of the popular Bucharest daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, devoted an entire page to articles related to the "suicide" of 21-year-old soldier Florin Constantin Badea, who, at the time of his death, was facing charges of desertion. Monica Zvirjinschi, chief editor of TINERETUL LIBER and author of one of the articles entitled "The Army, Which Is Killing Our Youth," wrote: "Because of the military mania for secrecy, we do not have any statistics. Instead, we have isolated cases of youths who have died in a bizarre way while in the military. The case in point is ambiguous and full of contradictions, like all the others which have appeared in the newspapers. We are presenting it in the hope that the army will admit that something happens to youths during military service, something serious which pushes the most carefree, frail, or sensitive young men toward an absurd death in peacetime." Subsequent issues of the paper reported on deaths of other conscripts that were declared to be suicides.

Views of Military Hospital Specialist

Under the title "Finally, the Ministry of National Defense Is Facing the Issue of Suicides in the Army," TINERETUL LIBER of 23-24 April reported on a news conference at the ministry at which Major General Dumitru Constantin, chief of the neuropsychiatry clinic of the Central Military Hospital and member of the Association of Scientists of Romania and the International Brain Research Organization, discussed suicides in the military. Constantin mentioned the influence of environment on the education and development of youths, stressing that suicides occur most frequently between the ages of 18 and 26. "Some soldiers cannot endure the rigors of military life. When they come in contact with weapons and the sometimes regrettable behavior of commanding officers, they carry the fatal action to the very end."

In an interview in the 12 May TINERETUL LIBER, Maj. Gen. Constantin stated: "It cannot be said that instances of suicide and desertion in the army have increased. Suicide occurs in equal measure both in civilian life and in the military." He spoke about the difficulties in adapting to army life, the availability of weapons, the humiliation of subordinates by young commanders, and the tendency to depict the military in a negative light. Asked whether the preinduction medical examination is relevant, Constantin said:

"There are some shortcomings in this area. The Faculty of Psychology has been disbanded. There should be a psychologist for each commissariat, and we do not have them in all the commissariats. But, certainly, cases which cannot be resolved at the commissariat level are taken care of in the military hospital. We have military standards to determine whether or not a person is fit for the army."

Constantin continued: "Don't we need to have some priest-confessors in the military units? A youth would go to a priest with a problem before he would go to a psychologist. I am almost certain that he would not tell anyone that he was thinking about suicide, but he would go to a priest if he thought as follows: 'There is a God, and what I want to do is in opposition to God's will. Wouldn't it be a good idea to talk to someone who is closer to God?' So, a priest would be able to stop him from doing it."

Asked whether some military officers are "out of tune with the times" and poorly trained in matters related to soldiers' psyches, Constantin said: "We require that every commander have good training in psychology.... We have stressed this point. We are all determined to eliminate any such cases. They are only sporadic cases." He said that there should be more talk about the duty to defend the country. "If military service is presented as a burden or an obligation, the youth will approach it with fear and the soldier will desert or do something else."

Ministry Commission Established

TINERETUL LIBER of 13 May carried the following item announcing an order by the new minister of national defense, Gheorghe Tinca, on the establishment of a commission to study suicides, desertions, and homicides in the army: "The review PANORAMIC has announced that an investigative report entitled 'Is the Army Really Killing the Youth?' will be presented at 1800 today on Channel 1 of Romanian Television [RTV] as part of the 'Pro-Patria' feature. The similarity of this title to the overall title for a number of items in TINERETUL LIBER and the polemical nuance prompted us to seek details from RTV. To our amazement, we discovered that the 'Pro-Patria' editorial staff had decided not to present the investigative report. Benone Neagoe told us why. Editor-in-chief Colonel Vasile Pricina took this step because the matter had attracted the attention of a special commission set up by the Ministry of National Defense. On the order of Minister Gheorghe Tinca, all cases of suicide, desertion, and homicide which have occurred recently in the army will be analyzed with special attention. According to the people at RTV, the program, the title of which was inspired by TINERETUL LIBER, will not be abandoned but only postponed until the study is completed. Col. Vasile Pricina will set up a roundtable discussion to which will be invited Maj. Gen. Dumitru Constantin, whom we interviewed in yesterday's paper, a psychologist, a sociologist, a priest, and an officer from a recruitment center. Benone Neagoe will visit military units to follow up some cases which were featured in the TINERETUL LIBER investigative report."

Factors Contributing to Suicides

The main opposition daily, Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA, on 17 May carried an article about suicides of young soldiers in Constanta whose "sad fate quickly became a 'military secret'." The article echoed the youth newspaper's call for psychologists in military units, someone who would have the patience to listen to the soldiers. After giving examples of two young conscripts who took their own lives, the author concluded as follows: "Suicides in Constanta military units are the result of a succession of phenomena and events, of existing social conditions, and of an increasingly narrow horizon offered to the younger generation. In the meantime, instances of death are increasing among conscripts. A short time ago, we noted that there was a strong feeling of frustration and dissatisfaction among young officers in Constanta units and that many of them thought that they were, unjustifiably, in 'dead end' positions. Added to all this are the abuses on the part of higher cadres and the atmosphere of lack of discipline."

Citing "well-informed sources in the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense", ROMANIA LIBERA on 25 May reported that the number of suicides in the military has tripled since 1989 and that these suicides were often accompanied by desertions and by dangerous behavior at the time of desertion. The paper said that

recent suicides among the troops were the result of the superficial medical exams which medical commissions give young soldiers at the time of their induction.

"The military hospitals are confronted with incredible situations for an army which wants to be integrated into NATO structures: the induction of soldiers who are unfit for military service.... When a youth with behavioral disturbances is inducted, his medical situation is aggravated by the precarious conditions existing in most of the military units: physical violence, humiliating punishments, miserable food and sanitation situations, permanent stress, excessive physical exertion, excessive consumption of alcohol. It should be pointed out that the military regulations in force contain clear medical criteria for inducting conscripts and clear accountability for those doctors who rule that a sick person is fit for military service."

Reasons for Acute Shortage of Medicines

94P20861A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 13 May 94 p 1

[Article by Adriana Vela: "The Pharmaceutical Industry Is in a Deep Coma"]

[Text] The systematic absence from the market of the most needed medicines—analgesics, fever drugs, liver medicines, ulcer drugs, eyewashes, anti-inflammatory drugs, expectorants, and nose drops—has reached an alarming level throughout the country: 60-75 percent. Of course, the first responsibility lies with the domestic pharmaceutical industry.

The medicine factories, just like all the commercial companies, are experiencing the difficulties of the transition, especially the lack of funds. For example, at the beginning of May, the Biofarm joint stock company had to collect 700 million lei from hospitals and pharmacies and to pay 400 million lei to its suppliers, at a time when the company's monthly production was approximately 1 billion lei. The company's director general, Iacob Barbos, told us: "Our main concern was to obtain raw material to keep up the production level."

Things are not at all simple because certain specific substances are used in the preparation of medicines. For example, acetone used to be supplied by the Brazi and Borzesti refineries, the only ones in the country which were specially equipped for this production. Then Borzesti stopped producing acetone and the Brazi production line has been undergoing overhauling for the past three months.

The crisis in raw materials has also been caused by the lack of medicinal plants which were grown, prior to 1989, in the agricultural production cooperatives, which have been dissolved. The same crisis exists in regard to specific animal subproducts—insulin, pituitary gland, thyroid extracts, etc.—which are required for certain medicines, a crisis which is currently being caused by the indolence of the people at the slaughterhouses and the absence of legal regulations which would make it obligatory for them to supply the required by-products to the pharmaceutical industry.

To resolve all these problems, the radical solution would be to import raw materials. However, since February 1994 this alternative has no longer existed. Article 14 of Government Ordinance No. 18 says that commercial companies which have debts to other suppliers do not have the right to deposit lei in bank accounts to obtain the necessary hard currency for imports. And this is in a situation in which the laws have generous provisions for obtaining hard currency for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages! The government will have to revise its legislative provisions so that the government ordinance mentioned above will not give the same treatment to the import of raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry and the import of Kent cigarettes and whiskey!

Foreign Minister Returns, Assesses UK Visit

AU2906204994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Discussions held with foreign and defense officials and with representatives of the British Parliament marked a change of attitude and of disposition which signify an increased interest in Romania's integration into European Structures, Teodor Melescanu, minister of state and Romania's foreign minister, said upon arriving at Bucharest Otopeni Airport after concluding his official visit to Great Britain.

The talks, which he assessed as cordial and constructive, focused mainly on the following issues: evaluating developments in our country, the potential to ensure the pace of reform, and political and social stability, with the goal of attracting British investors and businessmen to our country; supporting a reevaluation of cooperation in the production of BAC planes and the development of joint oil fields outside Romania's territory; and providing financial support in the current stage of transition and assistance to facilitate the promotion of Romanian products in EU markets and their penetration of EU markets.

Greek Minority Seeks Pensions, Churches

94P20873A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 20 May 94 p 10

[Interview with Anton Nicolau, deputy for the Greek minority in the Romanian Parliament, by Cristina Litescu; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Burlacu] Can you tell us about the beginnings of the Greek presence in Romania?

[Nicolau] The Greek minority is the oldest minority in Romania. It has been living on the present-day territory of Romania since the 7th or 8th century before Christ. [passage omitted]

[Burlacu] How have relations between Greece and Romania developed over the years?

[Nicolau] The father of history, Herodotus, called the Gets [Greek term for the Dacians] "the most courageous and most honorable of the Thracians." In time, things did not change too much and religion also played a role in the strong ties between the Romanians and the Greeks. In contrast to our neighbors, it can be said that Romanians and Greeks were born Christian. [passage omitted] In recent times, the Greek parliament was the first parliament to call for and support Romania's membership in the Council of Europe.

[Burlacu] What does the Hellenic Union of Romania propose?

[Nicolau] Immediately after World War II, the Greek community in Romania began to shrink. At present, it numbers about 10,000 members. Under these conditions, the Hellenic Union aims at the preservation of the Hellenic spirit, that is, the language, traditions, culture, and customs. Some 16 communities have been formed, from Piatra Neamt to Craiova, and in the port cities: Constanta, Sulina, Braila, Galati, and Tulcea. Of course, we are helped by Greece. We have close cultural ties and we also receive material assistance. But we also need support from the Romanian authorities. For example, after the installation of the communist regime in Romania, we gave over all our churches to the [Romanian] Patriarchate. Now we would like their return and also the return of the clubs and other institutions. Of course, there many problems but I have insisted that one injustice cannot be atoned for by another injustice.

Another one of our goals is to ensure that Greeks who came to Romania in 1947, after the Greek civil war, are given pensions. They lived and worked in Romania for many years and, after Prime Minister Papandreou came to power in 1982, they returned home. They worked here for all those years but they have not received any pensions. The according of such pensions would be a normal gesture, one of reparation, which has been the case in other countries.

[Litescu] For purposes of comparison, what do you think of Romania's law on minorities?

[Nicolau] It is a very good law. It is a good idea to ensure the presence of a representative for each of the minorities. The Romanians have not lost anything. On the contrary, they have gained a factor of stability between them and the Hungarians. If you would like me to make a comparison, it is superior to the Greek law on minorities.

[Litescu] As a representative of a minority, how do you think that the concepts of minority and majority will develop in the new structure of the European Union?

[Nicolau] Long ago, Alexander of Macedonia asked Diogenes to what city he belonged. Diogenes responded: "I am not a 'politis' (resident of a city); I am a 'cosmopolitis' (resident of the universe)". Therefore, the idea of belonging to the universe has existed since ancient times. As bureaucratic barriers disappear, the Europeans will be able to travel much more easily; as their ability to become informed increases, Europeans will no longer feel like "foreigners" to each other and will become a single nation.

Silajdzic: Group Should Not 'Legalise Genocide'

AU2906072794 Paris AFP in English 2340 GMT 28 Jun 94

[Text] Sarajevo, June 29 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on Tuesday insisted that the international contact group working on a peace settlement to the Bosnian conflict "should not legalise genocide and ethnic cleansing." The group, which includes delegates from the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, earlier met in Paris to conclude a planned carve-up of Bosnian territory, involving allocating 51 percent to the new Moslem-Croat federation and the remainder to the Serbs. The mainly Moslem Bosnian Government is demanding at least 58 percent, but the Serbs currently occupy about 70 percent.

Silajdzic said on Bosnian television that the international community "should hold on to the principle that people should return to their homes."

"We also asked them to envisage their response in the situation of possible Serb rejection but we did not get any answer," Silajdzic added. "We asked for the control of Bosnian borders with Serbia and Montenegro, since we think this is the principal problem. We did not get a positive answer." He said the only answer received was a possible lifting of the arms embargo in the Moslems' favour, which would "give us what already belongs to us—the right of self-defence."

If that failed, UN Security Council resolutions "should be implemented one by one. But since there are no clear answers nobody knows how the process will go on now," Silajdzic concluded. He added he was confident the Moslem-Croat federation, created in March, had a future, citing positive results it had already achieved such as opening road links between Moslem and Croat areas and allowing for easier movement of people and goods to reinforce the defence of Bosnia. Silajdzic said he believed no organised forces were at work trying to dismantle the federation. "Generally, the whole process of the implementation of the (federation) is going faster than we had hoped."

Karadzic Demands Compensation for Territories

AU2906185694 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jun 94 p 10

[Report by D. Kecman: "The Condition for an Agreement Is Lifting of the Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"]

[Text] Banja Luka, 26 Jun — "The Bosnian Serbs cannot accept the latest suggestions made by the contact group and will not accept a carve-up of Serbian territories, which means that the borders of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain along the Una, Sava, and Drina Rivers, and the border at Orasje still has to be negotiated.

"As a compensation for investments in infrastructure, the West will have to pay $7.5 billion to the Serbian side if the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has to make territorial concessions to the Muslim-Croatian Federation. This is the condition the Bosnian Serbs will ask the partners in negotiations about the proposed 51:49 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina to fulfill."

These are the two basic attitudes presented by Radovan Karadzic in Banja Luka yesterday evening [25 June], where he and Nikola Koljevic had talks with Banja Luka politicians and businessmen about the present political situation in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implementation of Avramovic's program.

What Does the United States Want?

Mr. Karadzic pointed out that the Serbs had been a nation since the time of St. Sava and that they were fighting now—with both political and military means—to remain a nation since the Serbs obviously no longer wanted some other nations to be created out of them. In connection with the maps for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina Karadzic said that it was still "a big unknown whether the United States wanted peace or war."

"If the United States wants peace, the maps will be acceptable for the Serbs with some corrections. We have confirmed in the latest international contacts that if the international community insists on a 49:51 percent partition, it will be possible to create a situation which will save its reputation. The Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia—Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica—as well as Orasje in the north should be given to the Muslim-Croatian Federation, in order to be taken back from them five seconds later, simultaneously in other words, and exchanged for something we can give them," Karadzic said and added:

"On the other hand, if someone wants to deprive us of some of our territories, he must give us money for it. I said that this sum would amount to approximately $7 billion, because of the infrastructure, industry, energy resources, etc.. If this sum is paid, the Muslim-Croatian Federation would be entitled to these territories. This request of mine was accepted with certain understanding. Answering their question of where to get all that money, I replied that the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina could offer a period of five years for paying off of all installments, one and a half billion per year."

Karadzic stressed that it was necessary to be wise in order to turn the military into a political victory and added that not only the parliament, but also the people of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would decide in referendums on certain concessions which would have to be made. He also mentioned the possibility that the present situation was sanctioned, although that meant that the Serbian Republic would not be recognized for a long time. Karadzic also said that there was a special war waged for the Province No. 3 according

to the earlier maps for Posavina, and that the Serbian side expressed distrust in the contact group. He also stated that the United States had the same attitudes toward Bosnia and toward Teheran, adding that the United States was biased and Russia not neutral. Karadzic said that the Muslim side favored the war option and that a large-scale offensive against the Ozren and Vozuca Mountains was going on before the world, adding that it was possible that the Serbs would replace passive with active defense and expel the Muslim army, thus proving to them and their friends that no military victory was possible over the Serbs. He added that political negotiations were the only possible option.

What Is Being Considered in Yugoslavia?

Replying to the question whether Yugoslavia supported the idea that Bosnian Serbs should sign the package proposed by the contact group, Karadzic said that Yugoslavia would never betray the Serbs who live across the Drina River regarding the issue of the creation of a Serbian state and its territorial integrity. According to Karadzic, Minister Jovanovic had stated that the Serbs should accept the offered percentage, which confirmed that Yugoslavia supported the theory that the Serbs should be satisfied with a half of Bosnia if their territory was in one piece.

"It would be very easy if it were true that all problems could be solved if the Serbs accepted things offered to them. We are afraid that this is not like that, though. We have even heard that the sanctions would not be lifted even if the Serbs accepted the proposed package. If this is so, we shall not accept anything. If sanctions are not lifted, if they are not an integral part of the package and the signed documents, we shall not even agree with 70 percent."

[Box, p 10]

Yugoslavia Should Make a Policy of Its Own

Addressing the second generation of noncommissioned officers at the Banja Luka Military School, Radovan Karadzic said: "We shall not sign unless sanctions are lifted. We think that Yugoslavia should disassociate itself from our problem since we are powerful enough to defend ourselves. The only things we need are, naturally, medicines and food, since all other warring factions receive help from someone else, too, even though no sanctions are imposed on them. In other words, Yugoslavia should make a policy of its own, and we should not criticize this."

UNPROFOR General Predicts '20 Years' of War

AU2906092094 Paris AFP in English 0730 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Sarajevo, June 29 (AFP)—The ceasefire in Bosnia is dead, which will mean at least another 20 years of fighting, British General Andrew Ridgeway, commander of part of the UN forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina, has warned. "There is no peace in Bosnia and no ceasefire. The ceasefire is dead. After the end of the ceasefire, there will be at least 20 years of war," the general said late Tuesday.

He made his grim prediction in the Croatian town of Metkovic, on the southern border with Bosnia, where one of the detachments under his command was escorting a convoy of 46 trucks loaded with 1,000 tons of electrical equipment for the power plant at Kakanj in central Bosnia.

Most of the fighting for the past week has been going on around Mount Ozren in northern Bosnia. The mountain range held by Serb forces is being attacked on its flanks by the Bosnian army. One of its goals is to capture part of the road, south of the mountains, linking the government-held towns of Tuzla in the north and Zenica in the centre. Securing the road would provide Bosnian forces with an all-weather route stretching from the Adriatic to Tuzla.

A ceasefire has been in force in theory since June 10 and is due to last a month. It was intended to facilitate peace negotiations between the parties to the conflict and the so-called contact group of mediating nations, Russia, the United States and the European Union.

General Ridgeway commands the southwest sector of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which comprises all of Hercegovina, central Bosnia and the west of Mount Ozren. The general, whose headquarters are in Gornji Vakuf in central Bosnia, has 5,500 men under his command, including British, Spanish, Canadian and Malaysian troops.

UN Ambassador: Government Opposes 'Division'

LD2906141794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1353 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem Ambassador to the United Nations Muhamed Sacirbey said Wednesday his government opposed a territorial division and that the war would go on for a long time. In a radio interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Sacirbey said his government was ready to fight not only for territory but also for the principle of a united Bosnia- Herzegovina complete with territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The international "Contact Group" for Bosnia has been meeting for weeks behind closed doors to map out a territorial division of Bosnia to give 51 percent of the territory to the Moslem-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Serbs.

In response to a BBC question as to why Moslem troops were attacking Serb civilians, Sacirbey said if Serb civilians were running away it was not because Moslem forces were making them do so.

The current Moslem offensive has driven thousands of civilians to flee the southern slopes of Mt. Ozren.

Moslem forces have been attacking Serb positions in northern Bosnia, especially around Doboj and Mt. Ozren, ever since the geneva one-month ceasefire agreement took effect June 10.

U.N. Protection Force commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina Gen. Michael Rose said Tuesday that the Bosnian Moslems were the greatest enemy to the peace agreement, saying they were constantly violating the ceasefire. Other U.N. representatives have recently reported that the Moslems are on the offensive and that the Bosnian Serbs have so far refrained from retaliating.

BBC radio broadcast also aired a commentary by military specialist Paul Beaver, the editor of JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY. Beaver said the Bosnian Moslem army has been reorganized and equipped. He said the Moslem army was receiving arms daily and that the troops were being trained by professionals, mainly Turkish army officers and mujaheddin from Iran, Pakistan and Morocco. Beaver said the Moslem troops were now prepared to switch from defensive to offensive warfare.

Serb Military Officials Cited on Counterattack

AU2906204594 Paris AFP in English 2024 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, June 29 (AFP)—Serb separatists launched a major counter-attack Wednesday against government troops in northeast Bosnia, the United Nations and Bosnian Serb sources said, amid frantic diplomatic moves to revive a shattered truce accord.

Bosnian Serb military officials cited here by the BETA news agency said large numbers of reinforcements had arrived during the day to push back attacks by the forces of the Croat-Moslem federation northwest of Mount Ozren. Federation troops were forced to retreat from a number of positions they had won during an offensive lasting more than 15 days, the agency said. Serb forces had captured two truckloads of munitions and a large quantity of weapons.

The officials added that the aim of the Serb counter-attack was to regain control of the strategic road link between the Moslem towns of Tuzla, to the north, and Zenica, in central Bosnia. [passage omitted]

RSK Serbs Use Tanks, Artillery Against Cazin

AU2906121494

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1000 GMT on 29 June within its regular 16- minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the republic.

Studio announcer Aida Omerovic reads a report from Mirza Sadikovic that "joint [Serbian and Abdic paramilitary] aggressors have been barbarously attacking the Bihac region over the past 24 hours. Taking part in these attacks increasingly overtly are [the leader of the Serbs in Croatia, Milan] Martic's Chetniks, who used howitzers and tanks to shell the outskirts of Cazin throughout last night." "Abdic's traitors were also launching attacks on all the front lines. All last night and this morning, Karadzic's Chetniks fired mortars at the Bihac section of the front and the Grmusko- Srbljanski plateau and also shelled the defense positions as well as suburbs in the Cazin and Bihac regions."

A report by the 3d Corps Press Center read by an unidentified correspondent says that "yesterday, the situation was the fiercest on the Zavidovici front" and that "following artillery preparations, the Chetniks launched a tank and infantry assault at the Humka-Imamovic-Talambas line. Used in the infantry assaults were the Panter and Mauzer units, the most elite of the Chetnik units, which continued their attacks until late last night. More than 2,000 shells of all kinds fell on an area in and around Hajdarevici. Most often used were sows [krmaca, 50-pound bombs]. Zavidovici's defenders successfully repelled all these attacks and liquidated dozens of the elite criminals." The correspondent goes on to say that "one of our reconnaissance units observed helicopters flying along the Doboj-Ozren route, as well as an intensified movement of vehicles from (Dejekovci) toward (Cijelova). Therefore, the Chetnik offensive along the 3d Corps defense lines is still under way."

Studio announcer Omerovic says that "yesterday and last night, the Chetniks increased their combat activities on the Kladanj front. They frequently directed small arms fire at the lines held by the 1st Muslim Podrinje Brigade and also used a sower of death [heavy machine gun] and an antiaircraft machine gun."

Omerovic goes on to say that "snipers are still operating in Gorazde, and the Chetniks are also using [word indistinct], mortars, and antiaircraft weapons" and that "the humanitarian situation in this town has become critical over the last 10 days or so as the Chetniks have not been allowing food convoys to enter."

A report by the Information Service of the Gradacac 107th Chivalrous Motorized Brigade, read by an unidentified correspondent, says that "yesterday was extremely dramatic in Gradacac. While small-caliber mortars, antiaircraft machine guns, antiaircraft guns, and small arms were used against the defense lines, long-range artillery targeted the town and its suburbs. The shelling started in the late afternoon and was fiercest in the Zelimir region, (Jasjenica), (Rajska), [words indistinct]. A tank, a ZIS gun, and 120-mm mortars were used against civilian districts. At 2100, 155-mm howitzers started to pulverize the town. Shells were falling at [words indistinct] intervals until 0500 this morning."

Attacks by Abdic, Serbian Forces in Bihac

LD2906205694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Excerpt] A three-year-old child was killed and a five-year-old child and its mother were seriously wounded.

These victims as well as (?scores) of other wounded civilians are a result of today's barbaric attacks on Buzim and other places in the Bihac municipality by Abdic's traitors. Martic's chetniks are continuing with their attacks on civilian targets, while Karadzic's chetniks are continuing with the shelling of our defense lines in almost the entire zone under the responsibility of the 5th Corps, especially around Bihac and the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau. [passage omitted]

Mt Ozren Reported Under Muslim Attack

LD2906234494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2256 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Zvornik, June 29 (TANJUG) - Bosnian Moslem forces continued an offensive in northern Bosnia, with Serbs on Mt. Ozren the target of the heaviest attacks, Bosnian Serb military sources said Wednesday.

Moslem small arms fire on Mt. Ozren, south of the town of Doboj, was accompanied by a heavy artillery bombardment and attempts to infiltrate Serb defences, the Bosnian Serb sources said.

The Bosnian Serbs said they returned fire, repelling the attacks and blocking the attempts to penetrate their lines.

Joint attacks by Bosnian Croat and regular Croatian Army troops were also reported around Orasje in northeastern Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs said the attacks were supported by artillery fire originating from the left bank of the Sava river in Croatia.

Moslem attacks were reported to be continuing around Brcko and Majevica in northern Bosnia, Bihac in western Bosnia and Konjic in southeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serb sources said Moslems in the U.N.-designated 'safe haven' of Gorazde had continued attacking communities on the right bank of the Drina. Gorazde is one of six Moslem-controlled 'safe havens' that enjoy U.N. protection.

Moslem sniper fire was also reported in Serb residential areas in Sarajevo, the Serb sources said.

Despite the Geneva one-month ceasefire agreement that was to take effect June 10, Bosnian Moslem army chief Rasim Delic last week announced a general offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and urged Croats to join in the attack.

'Fierce' Serb Artillery Attacks on Travnik

LD2906173094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Fierce Serb artillery attacks on Travnik and surrounding villages which are under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army have been resumed. One person has been killed and nine wounded.

Muslims Attack Serbs, Pursue 'Fratricidal' War

LD2906153594 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Report from Bihac area by Slavisa Sabljic]

[Excerpts] Since early morning Muslim extremists belonging to Izetbegovic's 5th Corps have been attacking Serb positions in Lohovska Brda, Golubic, and Pritoka near Bihac, using all available infantry weapons. [passage omitted]

Judging by reports from the two Muslim warring sides, Fikret Abdic's army launched a counteroffensive today. According to Radio Velkaton from Velika Kladusa, 5th Corps forces attempted infantry breakthroughs after shelling Trzac and Todorovo yesterday.

The fratricidal war between the [Cazin] Krajina Muslims resumed today and was marked by the Abdic army's fierce attacks near Pecigrad and Skokovi, according to sources close to the headquarters of Izetbegovic's army in Bihac.

Article: Ambassador's Statements Not U.S. Stance

AU2906152594 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jun 94 p 5

["M.B."-initialed article: "Galbraith Behind Galbraith"]

[Text] Unlike diplomatic representatives of other countries, Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, often appears in public. Another unusual thing is that he does not touch upon humanitarian and environmental issues, but most directly joins in the political life of the state to which he is ambassador. The Croatian public has acquired the opinion that the United States stands behind each political view Galbraith expresses. Of course, the average Croatian citizen was far more pleased by Galbraith's statements about state sovereignty than by his criticism regarding human rights and the like. However, this is not what this is all about. Galbraith's most recent exploit had to do with the degree of autonomy that Croatia should give the Serbs. He expressed the opinion that one should apply the U.S. model of federal states to the UNPA [UN-protected areas] zones. He also expanded that model a bit more, but, well, this can be further discussed in the Croatian parliament.

However, Galbraith is discussing that unnecessarily and doing so at a time when the country he represents has no official stance on the matter. Therefore, he is expressing his own opinion. This would also be no problem if some of the opposition leaders did not interpret this as an opinion discreetly proffered by the State Department and if they did not discuss it in their own speeches. After certain consultations, it has turned out that the whole issue of Galbraith's political lectures have, in fact, to do with his own "early works," behind which only he stands. After gaining this knowledge, it is clear why they (the lectures) no longer bear the importance they used to.

Serbs Block Galbraith's Access to Vukovar

AU2906184294 Paris AFP in English 1829 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Zagreb, June 29 (AFP)—Serb separatists barred the United States ambassador to Croatia Wednesday from entering an area of the country under their control, a diplomatic source said. Peter Galbraith, who is currently visiting parts of eastern Croatia, was prevented from gaining access to the town of Vukovar, the source said. An official of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in nearby Erdut told AFP that local Croatian Serb officials had demanded that Galbraith obtain clearance to enter the town from separatist authorities in Knin.

Knin is the stronghold of the Serbs' self-declared Republic of Krajina, which covers around a third of Croatia. The Zagreb source was unable to say why the ambassador had been turned back.

Since being appointed to the Zagreb post a year ago, Galbraith has made three visits to Vukovar, which was destroyed in November 1991 by the former Yugoslav army after a three-month siege. The U.S. diplomat visited Knin in mid-June, on the eve of a new series of subsequently annulled peace negotiations between Zagreb and separatist authorities.

At that time Galbraith reminded the separatists that no member of the international community recognised Krajina or its ambition to be incorporated in a greater Serbia.

Mikelic Announces FRY Citizenship for Serbs

AU2906174794 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jun 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Krajina Population—Citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"]

[Text] Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], said for TANJUG that RSK citizens (and the citizens of the Srpska republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, naturally) would be entitled to citizenship of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"We have been waging a defensive war since 1991. Yugoslavia has remained our home country. We have, in fact, never left Yugoslavia. If there is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, why should RSK citizens not be its citizens, too?" Mikelic said.

"It is certain that the RSK Serbs will continue to struggle for their own state," the RSK prime minister stated and continued: "It is very important, however, that they are granted the right to Yugoslav citizenship."

"Approximately 350,000 Serbs have left Croatia because they do not want to be loyal to Franjo Tudjman and his regime," Mikelic added.

"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is behaving quite correctly toward refugees, but they have no right to vote. Germany united, and yet the Serbs are not allowed to remain in the state in which they lived! Is this policy not banal and senseless?

Croatian Serbs have challenged their minority status, which they had had according to the 1990 Croatian Constitution. They waged the war in Croatia because they wanted to stay in Yugoslavia," Mikelic was decisive.

"We signed the peace treaty because we have always supported peaceful solutions to all problems. We want to lead negotiations with the Croatian side. It opposes negotiations though, which has recently been openly demonstrated, too.

The Serbian side wants to lead negotiations in which both sides would have equal positions, but Croatia does not want just negotiations on economic issues. It wants to hold negotiations on political issues, which are final and indisputable for us.

The Croatian side keeps repeating that complex problems between Croatia and the RSK will be solved with the reintegration of Krajina into Croatia, but this is out of the question. We say, for example: "The problem of the highway between Zagreb and Belgrade will be solved after the Serbs have returned to their 183 villages in Western Slavonia," Mikelic added.

As a very important fact, Mikelic pointed out that the population of the RSK had confidence in authorities of their own. According to Mikelic, the people feel that "no one has sold them and that no one can sell them."

Mr. Mikelic also stated that the economy had been revived and that food produced by them would exceed the needs of the RSK by 50 percent. He added that smuggling and various "profiteering" channels had been brought under control. "The RSK increasingly resembles a constitutional state. Murderers do not walk on RSK roads any longer," Mikelic concluded.

[Box, p 2]

Roosevelt's Request

"Roosevelt required that Croatia be isolated for at least 50 years because of the Independent Croatian State [NDH]. During World War II, the Serbs fought against the NDH and were victims of the Ustasha genocide," Mikelic says and adds: "Croatia became one of the winners only owing to the Serbs."

Now the Croatian political leadership from the Croatian Democratic Community forced the Krajina Serbs to solve the Serbian issue themselves, although they did not have these intentions. There is no return now. The Vance plan is an important event in this respect," Mikelic concluded.

Tudjman Talks to Refugees, Views Problems

LD2906151294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Excerpts] The Croatian president has received a delegation of the Association of Croatian Refugees in the presidential palace. The delegation informed him about the association's activity and work so far, and stressed its dissatisfaction with the mandate of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], which has failed to implement a single Security Council resolution.

In connection with this, the Association of Refugees has requested that the Croatian Government, the Croatian state leadership and the president of the republic, as well as UNPROFOR, to urgently implement Security Council resolutions whereby the return of refugees and the reintegration of the occupied areas into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia would begin immediately.

The president of the republic informed the delegation about all measures that the Croatian state leadership has taken to enable the refugees to return to their homes and to reintegrate the occupied areas. He urged understanding of all the refugees' actions, but said at the same time that the efforts by the state leadership in the process of reintegrating the occupied areas and enabling the refugees to return—primarily by peaceful means—must not be hindered. In connection with this the president stressed that the Croatian state leadership has no more important task than to liberate the occupied territories and enable the return of refugees to their homes. [passage omitted]

The talks were also attended by Ivic Pasalic, the president's adviser for internal policy, and Abalbert Rebic, the head of the government's office for refugees, according to a statement from the office of the president of the republic.

Granic News Conference in Spain Reported

LD2906163594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic ended his first official visit to Spain by holding a news conference. Answering a question on solving the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, the Croatian minister said that the Contact Group's proposal will be of paramount importance, but a military solution was not out of the question. Andjelko Perincic reporting from Madrid.

[Perincic] Minister Granic informed Spanish journalists that he had several meetings with politicians yesterday. An unavoidable topic in all talks was the crisis in the region, especially a solution for the Croatian occupied areas.

[Begin Granic recording] Our aim is to have all Security Council resolutions implemented. We will try to achieve that through a strong diplomatic initiative, with the help of the Council of Europe, through an open discussion of it as a separate item at the UN General Assembly session and in the Security Council, and especially through pressure on Serbia to exert influence on the UN Protected Areas for the local Serbs to accept serious negotiations and solve the problem of the occupied areas in the Republic of Croatia by peaceful means. [end recording]

[Perincic] Minister Granic said that he expected a lot from the so-called Contact Group's initiative on a solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina whereby the territory is divided, granting 51 percent to the Croat-Bosniak federation and 49 percent to the Serbs.

Speaking about bilateral cooperation between Croatia and Spain, two agreements that have been signed and three that have been almost completed, guarantee the mutual wish to improve relations, especially in the sphere of the economy and culture. Spain's support for our acceptance in international financial institutions is particularly welcome, our minister said.

Answering journalists' questions, Granic said that a referendum on a confederation with the Bosnian federation will be possible in Croatia only after that state was set up. He also said that Croatia would like the Contact Group's proposal to be reviewed at the upcoming G-7 summit in Naples.

Police Arrest Slovene Film Crew in Istria

AU2906132694 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jun 94 p 56

[HINA report on Ministry of Interior statement on Slovene reporters' arrest, issued in Zagreb on 23 Jun: "Angry Locals Informed the Police"]

[Text] Reporters for Slovene Television, who had been shooting a story in Istrian villages in the municipalities of Buzin and Skudelin, were brought to the police station in Buje. The Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia issued a statement on Thursday [23 June], which we convey in full:

"The Police Administration of Istria—the police station of Buje—has submitted a warrant to initiate criminal proceedings against four members of a Slovene Television crew on the basis of the law on bringing in and employing foreign mass media and foreign information activities, as well as the Law on Disturbing Public Law and Order.

It states that there is reason to suspect that on 22 June 1994 in the afternoon, while filming material for the television program "Weekly" in Buzin and Skudelin, close to the Croat-Slovene border, Slovene reporters and cameramen were asking Croatian citizens questions concerning their national and state orientation, their orientation toward Croatia or Slovenia, as well as questions related to the border between the two states. These questions distressed the citizens, who informed the police about these activities. It was also established that the suspects were shooting a documentary program for Slovene Channel One, which was supposed to be broadcast tonight, without any valid accreditation or permits issued by the relevant body of the Republic of Croatia.

The report of the border police station of Buje concerning this violation states that the Television Slovenia team did not declare the television recording equipment upon entering the Republic of Croatia at the Kastel border crossing, which implies a customs violation, reads the Ministry of Interior statement.

Refugees Plan To Block UNPROFOR Movement

LD2906124694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1233 GMT 29 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Zagreb, June 29 (TANJUG)—Croatia continued its campaign against United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR], with a Zagreb daily on Wednesday saying refugees would completely block the movement of U.N. personnel. The VECERNJI LIST said that on Friday, July 1, a "total blockade" would be set up against UNPROFOR, marking a "hot summer" in which "Croatian patience is running short". The blockade is to last until the September 30 end of the UNPROFOR mandate. The peacekeepers in the former Yugoslav territory of Croatia are deployed in the republic of Serb Krajina, which was designated a U.N. Protected Area in March 1992.

Serbs in the region declared independence when Croatia seceded from former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution. VECERNJI LIST said the refugees' blockade had not been organized by Croatian authorities and said no official statement had been issued on the matter. The Croatian authorities have in the past said they would not allow renewals of the UNPROFOR mandate unless the peacekeepers cooperated with Croatian Government plans to reestablish control over the Serb area.

VECERNJI LIST issued a critical commentary in which it said UNPROFOR personnel moved through Croatia like "occupying forces." Press reports on Tuesday said refugees would close all UNPROFOR control points and would also block movement by representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Figures on War Casualties Released

94BA0330C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Snjezana Canic: "7,827 Missing Persons and 290 Prisoners"]

[Text] According to the most recent figures of the Republic of Croatia, 28,135 were wounded in the war, 7,187 were killed, 7,827 are missing, and 290 are prisoners. Wounded civilians number 8,284, while 2,578 were killed. Since the requests have been renewed, requests are now outstanding for 2,750 imprisoned, missing or taken away by force, as follows: 227 in Osijek-Baranja Zupanija, 1,413 missing person requests in Vukovar-Srem and Osijek-Baranja zupanijas, which is half of the total requests in all of Croatia. In Vinkovci, for example, no fewer than 79 missing persons are being traced.

Members of the families of the victims talked with representatives of government offices on Saturday about the problems of tracing the missing persons and prisoners. The meeting was arranged at the suggestion of Ivan Gruic, chairman of the government Commission for Prisoners and Missing Persons, Zvonimir Knezevic, director of the government Office for War Victims, Milivoj Tomas, director of the government Office for Relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], and Zdenka Farkas, vice president of the Association for Prisoners and Missing Persons in Zagreb.

The Serbian Side Refuses to Supply Figures

Be assured that the Croatian Government is doing everything to obtain information about prisoners and missing persons, but the Serbian side will not supply everything until forced to do so. This will occur when we get back the occupied areas and when Croatian authority begins to function in them, emphasized Branimir Glavas, zupan of Osijek and Baranja, addressing the mothers and wives of prisoners and missing persons. "The day is coming closer and closer when Croatia will be free and entire, which will come about, if necessary, through the military option and at the price of additional casualties. We must be ready for anything, since otherwise all the casualties up to now would be in vain. Until then let all the graves whose whereabouts we know of rest in peace and wait for the return of the Croatian Army and Government."

In a meeting lasting more than four hours, which was also attended by Ante Kuic, coordinator of the government Commission for Prisoner Exchanges in Sector East, and Stefica Krstic, president of the Osijek Association of Families of Missing and Imprisoned Croatian Defenders, it was said that the government had not done everything it should concerning care for the victims of the homeland war. That is why a program was drawn up on 18 May of this year, to step up care for the victims.

Milivoj Tomas, director of the government office for relations with UNPROFOR, spoke about the tasks of UNPROFOR, the UNHCR [UN High Commission for Refugees], the International Red Cross, and the EC [European Community] Observer Mission, emphasizing that since the Blue Helmets arrived in Croatia another 7,000 Croats have been driven out of the occupied areas, and the members of UNPROFOR have become the Serbs' main suppliers.

"Over the year that has past since establishment of the Commission for Prisoners and Missing Persons, 202 prisoners have been released, mostly from the areas of Slavonia and Baranja, and we have managed to obtain the bodies of 160 who were killed. Following the release of the Sombor group, which was the last group of prisoners registered with the International Red Cross, the Serbian side began to spread diverse disinformation. But in spite of their false assertions that there are no prisons or prisoners, we found another 10 persons who were released from Belgrade through Knin about 20 days ago. One person has been in the jails of Knin for two years now; following a protest sent to the International Red Cross, we are expecting specific help in obtaining his release," said Ivan Gruic, chairman of the government Commission for Prisoners and Missing Persons. At the same time, he praised the exceptional cooperation and support of the Osijek-Baranja Zupanija in the tracing effort.

The temperature in the meeting rose considerably when the figures were presented; they present a gloomy picture for people who have been looking for their nearest and dearest for more than two years now. With stormy emotions and often tears in their eyes, mothers and wives presented their cases, dwelling particularly on the fate of the wounded from the Vukovar Hospital, of whom there has been no trace of survivors since 18 January 1991. Unfortunately, only one person managed to get out—two days after the fall of that heroic city. Numerous rumors and lies being broadcast by the Serbian media, especially TV Beli Manastir, are evoking fear and distrust in people who hope that they will learn the truth about their family members, however, grave and tragic it might be.

Increased Strength of UN Forces on Ovcara

"The region of Ovcara is at this moment protected by stronger UN forces, since this was demanded by the Croatian Government, and so people should not be taken in by the Serbian propaganda. Incidentally, the Serbs have broken off communication since the joint commissions were established to clear up many cases of prisoners and missing persons," the guests from Zagreb said. One mother responded to this in tears: "We are not seeking anything Serbian, but only our own. If nothing is done, we will soon have streets full of drug addicts and mentally unstable young people, not the mature and sound Croatian generation we fought for. No one remembered us, the mothers and families of the prisoners and missing persons, on any of the holidays devoted to the Croatian state."

In closing the meeting, in which the reproach was made that the problem of the prisoners and missing persons has not been well covered in the media, Stefica Krstic, chairwoman of the Association of Imprisoned and Missing Croatian Defenders in Osijek, called for President Tudjman to make a greater effort to solve all the cases of tracing the persons who are missing, imprisoned, and taken away by force: "We are demanding the truth, since we have come to the end of our patience. If it is known that our people have been killed, make it possible for us to obtain their remains."

Kumanovo Serbs Reject Census Results

AU3006102794 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 30 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Census '94"]

[Text] The census in Tetovo, Kicevo, and Gostivar finally started, on the 8th day of the census. There are still cases of refusal by census clerks to work, but they are immediately replaced by others. But, in certain census centres of Makedonska Kamenica, the census is boycotted by the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Muslims, who demand that the census is carried out in Turkish, although they do not speak the language. In Kumanovo, the Democratic Alliance of Serbs' committee group reacted to the township refusal to include a Serbian member in the census committee. A representative of the group stated Serbs will in consequence not accept the census results.

Polls Reveal Support for Parties

AU2906131294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 29 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Data Press Research"]

[Text] According to a research conducted by the Data Press Agency of the paper NOVA MAKEDONIJA, should elections take place as soon as tomorrow, part of the voters in Macedonia will be divided into two equal parts—SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] would gain 14 percent each. Out of 600 random polled citizens, 35.67 percent have not yet decided which party to vote for, while 17.33 percent said they would not vote for any of the present parties. 52 percent do not know why exactly they would give their vote to a party, and 28.33 percent said parties' programs would influence their decision. 53.67 percent of the polled citizens expect of the new parliament mostly to be more efficient than the current one.

The poll shows PDP and NDP [People's Democratic Party] have the most stable votes, as even 97.5 percent of their followers during the first elections will also give their vote to these parties in the upcoming elections. This percentage is 88.89 among voters for VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], 73.08 for SDSM, and 33.33 for the Liberals. Although stating no precise figures, Data Press still informs that the Democratic Party has made a major breakthrough in winning over possible votes.

Figures on Membership in Political Parties

94P20926A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 7 Jun 94 p 8

[Editorial Report] The Skopje daily VECER publishes a report on political party membership in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) by S.Kr. on page 8 on 7 June. The author notes that all of the figures are provided by the parties themselves.

Of the four parties in the governing coalition, the ethnic-Albanian PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity) is the largest, with 53,000 "recruited" members, according to its own statistics. The SDSM (Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) says that it has 30,000 members. The Socialist Party maintains that it has 45,000 members, while the Liberal Party records the modest figure of 8,000, according to the article.

The author also provides statistics for two opposition parties. The VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) claims 300,000 members, including those living beyond FYROM's borders. Petar Gosev's Democratic Party currently has 11,000 members, but is striving to increase the number to 17,000 before the parliamentary elections begin.

While most of the extraparliamentary parties are not included in the report, membership figures provided by the Social Democratic Party (18,000) and by the Republican Party (6,000) are cited.

The author notes in conclusion that, if the numbers given by these eight parties out of some 60 registered are correct, then almost one-quarter of the population of FYROM would belong to a political party.

Commission Adopts New Stance on Croatian Border

AU2906155594 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] We have learned that, at a closed session yesterday, the State Chamber Commission for International Relations adopted a so-called proposal of views and measures for the drawing of the border with Croatia, that is to say, a document that had been prepared by the working group of the Borders Commission. As is known, the document marked top secret was distributed to journalists by deputy Zmago Jelincic some 14 days ago and on that occasion our radio station summarized its contents, too.

The negotiating platform for the drawing of the international border has changed considerably with the views adopted yesterday, as they, among other things, state that the last internationally recognized border in Istria was the southern border of the Free Territory of Trieste and the Mirna River, and that two solutions must, therefore, be pursued in the negotiations—the border of the Zone B, as the last internationally recognized border, or the southern border of the land registry' districts of Kastel and Savudrija, as the components of Piran commune, with the sea border that would allow free access to the open sea.

Commission President Zoran Thaler commented on this decision for Radio Slovenia as follows:

[Begin Thaler recording] The State Chamber Commission for International Relations was in session yesterday. It adopted a proposal of views and measures for the drawing of the border with Croatia. We forwarded this proposal of views and measures to the government and, naturally, also to the Foreign Ministry. I must emphasize that the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs would, in this way, like to help widen the maneuvering space of the negotiating team for the border with Croatia, because the Commission in a way feels that our part of the negotiating team has been deadlocked and perhaps the negotiations on the border with Croatia have not move from a standstill precisely for this reason.

I would also like to point out that there is a belief in the commission that, after the third anniversary of Slovenia's problems and open questions with Croatia, it is high time that we resolve these problems with appropriate interstate agreements. The commission supports the efforts of the government and Prime Minister Drnovsek to reach contextual agreements and agree on the resolution of the problems in a package prior to the meeting with Croatian Prime Minister Valentic, that is to say, to search for compromises and compensations among various fields of problems. [end recording]

Peterle Denies Yielding to Italian Demands

AU2906155694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Report by Vesna Burnik]

[Text] As Tomaz Kunstelj, president of the diplomatic Borders Commission, said at today's regular monthly news conference by the foreign minister, the Foreign Ministry has not adopted any astonishingly new views regarding the platform on borders adopted by the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission. The government will discuss the document as a part of all open issues between the countries. Foreign Minister Peterle was very brief in his reply:

[Begin Peterle recording] For the time being, we do not wish to comment on it. [end recording]

Foreign Minister Peterle today announced a meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic, which will take place on 1 July, and will be a part of preparations for the talks of [Slovene and Croatian] prime ministers that are scheduled to take place in Ljubljana on 8 July.

The interstate Slovene-Italian Commission for Property and Legal Matters will meet again in Ljubljana tomorrow. Minister Peterle said that the mandate of the Slovene part of the Commission is clear: By this he rebuffed the writing of Trieste IL PICCOLO, that at the above meeting Ljubljana would allegedly offer 300 to 400 apartments to Italy that used to belong to what are now the Italian citizens.

The Slovene stance remains unchanged. Namely, all these issues have already been resolved with the Rome Treaty, and the Italian demand thus lacks any legal basis.

When asked whether Slovenia has any intention of passing appropriate amendments to the Constitution regarding the property of foreigners, Peterle replied that our country will have to amend this provision sometime and that it would be good if we started the procedure soon and thus matched the European standards. He emphasized, however, that the property issue as it is being raised by Italy has already been resolved once and for ever as regards Slovenia. He added:

[Begin Peterle recording] If we were to discuss Slovenia acknowledging Italy's political interest and, under certain circumstances, allowing access to this property, then Slovenia would expect the same move by Italy, which confiscated a lot of property belonging to Slovenes without any compensation during the Fascist rule and has never returned it to these original owners. [end recording]

[Burnik] The foreign minister also said that Slovenia had tried to organize talks with the Italian foreign minister at the beginning of July, but that due to tight schedule, as it was stated in Rome, the talks will not be held. This will happen at the Trieste summit in mid-July.

Peterle has no information that Prime Minister Berlusconi would not arrive in Trieste. Regarding reports that [Slovene and Croatian] Presidents Kucan and Tudjman will also attend the talks in Trieste, Peterle said that this was probably a slip and that he found such an option unlikely.

Federal

Officials Call For Normalization of Relations

LD3006000994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2247 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—A resumption of the normalization of Serb-Croat relations would be in the interest not only of the two peoples but also of the stabilization of the situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Deputy Yugoslav Prime Minister Zeljko Simic and president of the Serb Democratic Forum in Croatia Milorad Pupovac set out in Belgrade on Wednesday. Simic chairs the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia committee for the normalization of relations with the Republic of Croatia.

Relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia are burdened by the issue of Serbs in Croatia, who had the status of a constituent people while Croatia was part of the former Yugoslav federation. After Croatia seceded in 1991, it denied Serbs the status of a people and proclaimed them a national minority.

Serbs responded to the secession and the downgrading of their status by proclaiming the republic of Serb Krajina. Croatia does not recognize the republic of Serb Krajina and has tried four times forcibly to introduce its rule there.

Simic and Pupovac said no lasting solution to the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia—above all an end to the war and a political agreement—would be possible without direct and internationally recognized talks between political representatives of the two peoples.

The talks showed that both sides were optimistic that the process of the normalization of Serb-Croat relations would be resumed as soon as possible, the statement released by the Yugoslav Information Ministry said.

Pupovac said the Serb Democratic Forum was ready, within its possibilities, to contribute to the renewal of the normalization process.

The normalization process, inaugurated in March this year, was broken off in mid-June because the Croatian side insisted on political talks, while the Serbs were ready only on the initially agreed talks on the re-establishing of economic ties which would not prejudice any political solution.

Government To Cooperate With UNPROFOR

LD2806195994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1905 GMT 28 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, JUNE 28 (TANJUG)—The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will do everything in its power for the success of the U.N. peace operation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic said in a reply to a letter sent to him on June 20 by Civil Affairs Director of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Sergio Vieira de Mello.

In the letter delivered on Tuesday to Civil Affairs Coordinator at the Belgrade UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] headquarters Vladislav Gerasev, Simic said the Yugoslav Government would continue constructively to cooperate with UNPROFOR, in line with its principled and peaceful policy in the resolution of the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Information Ministry said.

Simic described as unfounded Vieira de Mello's statement that the Yugoslav Government was not cooperative and ready, together with the chief UNPROFOR headquarters, to find solutions to issues of mutual interest, the statement said.

Simic said the procedure, notification and regulation of the movement of UNPROFOR convoys were being applied extremely flexibly, the statement set out.

Simic stressed that, although the Yugoslav Government had taken a decision in May to stiffen the visa regime for UNPROFOR personnel, Yugoslav authorities were tolerating the bending of rules in the issue of visas to UNPROFOR members.

Simic said that Yugoslavia was no longer able, for objective reasons, to pay for services and facilities used by UNPROFOR and UNPROFOR, itself, would have to do so in the future, the statement said.

Redman, Churkin May Visit Belgrade 29 Jun

LD2806202994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1934 GMT 28 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Moscow, June 28 (TANJUG)—Special Russian and United States presidential envoys for the former Yugoslavia Vitaliy Churkin and Charles Redman, respectively, could visit Belgrade on Wednesday, well-informed sources in Moscow said on Tuesday. According to the same sources, Churkin and Redman will meet with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to discuss the Bosnian conflict. Churkin and Redman are to inform Belgrade about the work of the international "contact group" for Bosnia-Herzegovina, above all regarding territorial issues. According to sources close to the Russian Foreign Ministry, ranking Foreign Ministry official Aleksey Nikiforov, who participates in the work of the "contact group" in Paris, will most likely travel to Belgrade in place of Churkin. No official confirmation has been made that Churkin and Redman will visit Belgrade.

Conflict Between Serbia, Krajina Serbs Viewed

94BA0328A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 94 pp 16-18

[Article by Filip Svarm: "Hostage Rhetoric"]

[Text] *Since 1992, a change in the attitude that "Serbia is being defended in Knin" has been perceptible in various letters and addresses. Now, apparently, Serbdom is being defended in Belgrade.*

Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], had a respite for a moment after sending congratulations to his counterparts throughout the world, and so, for a change, at the 12th congress of Yugoslav trade unions in Novi Sad, he pounded his fist on the table and shouted: "Millions of citizens of Yugoslavia cannot be hostage for any leader, either from the territory of the FRY, or the republic of Srpska [RS], or the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]. No one gave them that right, and this war has to be ended (...). Therefore, (the people) justifiably expect success in the peace negotiations, and cannot consent to the option of dragging them out endlessly."

Lilic did not say specifically which leaders he was actually thinking of. RSK President Mile Martic, in the fear that the Yugoslav president might—God forbid—name him in this context, hastily announced a resumption of the negotiations with the Republic of Croatia, at Plitvice on 16 and 17 June. He temporarily forgot all the previous conditions—from revoking UN Security Council Resolution 820, to demands for negotiations in Geneva. His prime minister, Boris Mikelic, did not lag behind: "Mr. Lilic is absolutely a friend of the Krajina, and he has the right to point it out if he thinks that any leader, through his destructive behavior, has stopped certain processes..." Also, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, did not remain indifferent, forcing his fighters—who he claimed were civilians—to withdraw to a circle of three kilometers from the center of Gorazde, he reluctantly agreed to a ceasefire for one month with the Muslim-Croatian federation. It was only the FRY where no one considered himself denounced, except perhaps General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff. He emphasized at a news conference that not a single member of the Yugoslav Army was fighting in the RS and RSK, and that they were not causing the incidents on the border with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Albania, or putting pressure on Kosovo.

It turns out, therefore, that Lilic's mentioning hostages had an effect: specifically, he is not the one according to whose statements one should act. President of the Srpska republic Slobodan Milosevic is inclined to accept the peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus get rid of the sanctions, as his wife, Dr. Miljana Markovic, who is also a high-level official in the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ], indicated a month ago in her public daily newspaper: "As far as the war is concerned, the Serbs in Serbia have paid their debt in all the wars in this world (...). But the representatives of those Serbs (mostly outside of Serbia) who think that war is their only choice, i.e., a necessity that cannot be avoided, should not attribute that choice to the entire Serbian people, especially this people in Serbia."

The Ones Across the Border

This, however, is not the first mention of hostages when Belgrade has demanded that its satellites across the Drina (the novelty is the mention of "leaders from the FRY") retreat, and from all indications, as with the previous references, this will not pass without bitter conflicts and realignments among Serbs.

The first one to announce that expression, along with many other things, was Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], who said in October 1991 on NTV's Studio B that "By beginning to talk about Serbia proper, what they mean to say is that the Serbs in Serbia are protesting the fact that no one actually asks them about anything. This is not the first time that the motherland has been deprived of the significance that it had and that the motherland nation—and Serbs are not the only exception here—has found itself at a certain point in a disagreement of some sort with the nation's periphery." Since at that time the Belgrade regime was adhering to the position that "Serbia is being defended in Knin," Draskovic was denounced yet again as a traitor.

Just two months later, however, Milosevic repeated his words in a much harsher form when Milan Babic, then president of the RSK, refused to accept the Vance Plan. In a famous open letter to Babic on 9 January 1992, he said: "Through your behavior, you have ignored the explicit positions of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the leadership of Serbia, and not for the first time, giving yourself the right to make decisions for which the entire Serbian people, unfortunately, is paying in blood (...). I believe and hope that the Krajina's citizens will not support you in such actions. The fact that Serbia is offering you comprehensive and unselfish support does not mean that you have gained the right to decide on the lives of its citizens. Serbia's citizens are not your hostages, nor will they be."

If the president of Serbia thought that Babic would disappear from the political scene just like that, he was quite mistaken; the Krajina leader embarked on a counteroffensive, the idea of which was determining whether Knin really was Serbia's capital. He published his answer to Milosevic just two days later: "We particularly regret that you said that Serbia's citizens are not and will not be our hostages (...). We cannot interpret your comments about Serbian support as anything else but a call for that support to disappear. We are certain, however, that there is no one who could issue such an order to the Serbian people and have it carried out (...). We will defend ourselves even in that situation, naturally with assistance from Serbs who are not indifferent to us and to the Serbian national question."

Babic was nevertheless replaced a month later, when Milosevic, through a combination of various pressures, found new followers in the Krajina. Almost no one backed the Knin leader, at least in Serbia—regardless of how much he accused the leadership of Serbia proper and the army of communism, and represented himself as an anticommunist. Ilija Radulovic, then vice president of the SPO, thus stated that he would have also fully signed off on Milosevic's letter, and Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic said that no one had the right to gamble with the fate of the Serbian people. It was only a communique from the Democratic Party that, in addition to welcoming the Vance Plan, said that it was not suitable for the president of Serbia proper to replace legally elected representatives of the Serbian people outside of Serbia, and the party's president at that time, Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic met with Babic—if that could mean anything at all. Thus, everyone was sick of the war in Croatia, the "new" watchword had become "Serbia is defended in Belgrade," and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was in sight.

Drunken Poker Players

The people on the other side of the border were "kidnappers" of Serbia's citizens once again, but this time from Bosnia. A year after the outbreak of the conflict, the Vance-Owen Plan appeared on the agenda; although it formally meant preserving the integrity of that former Yugoslav republic, it actually represented its partition, and as such was acceptable to the president of Serbia. It was unacceptable to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, however; it seemed to him that he would lose everything that he had gained by the sword. For the most part, at the beginning of January 1993 he stubbornly refused to sign the proposed constitutional principles for the future Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Dragoslav Rancic, at one time an adviser to former FRY President Dobrica Cosic, states in his book "Authority Without Power," at the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (Geneva, 10-12 January 1993), Milosevic assumed the task of persuading Karadzic to consent to what was being demanded, and to sign. "You cannot hold all of Yugoslavia hostage," Milosevic told Karadzic, to which the latter responded that no one understood why he was insisting on including the constituent unit in the paper. "[Expletive] the constituent unit," the president of Serbia proper retorted. "The people is the constituent unit, but you got stuck over the hills and valleys (...). The world will still understand that you do not agree with the maps, but no one understands that [expletive] constituent unit." Karadzic gave in and signed the constitutional principles, but when it was time to sign the maps according to the Vance-Owen Plan (with the ultimatum to the FRY that if there were no agreement the sanctions would be made harsher), he became obstinate again and resorted again to "holding hostages."

"You do not have the right to threaten 10 million citizens of Yugoslavia," Milosevic, Cosic, and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic wrote to the RS Assembly deputies, who refused at a session in Bijeljina to accept the peace plan, "because of the remaining unresolved issues, among the results that have been achieved (...). We are granting ourselves as much right as you to make decisions that are significant to the Serbian people."

Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and their deputies, however, remained intransigent in their refusal. They were not even shaken by the presence of the three signers of the above-mentioned letter, reinforced by Greek Prime Minister Konstantin Mitsotakis, not even when there was another attempt at the RS Assembly's session in Jahorina to persuade them to sign. Also, the attempt to organize an "all-Serbian parliament" in Belgrade, modeled after the Cominform and with the same purpose, was a failure; the Bosnian Serbs and the opposition parties in Serbia proper boycotted it, and Dr. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], openly expressed solidarity with Dr. Karadzic. All of this disgrace, full of humiliation for Milosevic, ended, along with harsher sanctions, in the observation that if Pale were not the capital of Serbia, Belgrade was not the capital of the Republic of Srpska either. The president of Serbia proper characterized the action by the Bosnian Serbs' representatives as the behavior of "drunken poker players," and prohibited Dr. Biljana Plavsic, a member of the RS Presidency, from crossing the Drina once. He commented that she belonged in a mental hospital; and then everything was forgotten.

What Now

Lilic's statement came at a time when there was a great deal of speculation that the United States was ready to moderate the sanctions against Serbia if the Muslims rejected the latest peace plan, but the Serbs proved to be cooperative. Allegedly, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher is conducting talks on that precise topic at a ministerial meeting in Istanbul. If that is true, Slobodan Milosevic cannot do anything but take advantage of such an opportunity; it should be expected that he will not refrain from any pressures whatsoever against all those who may spoil things, and that he will not stop at prohibiting a few trucks from the RS from entering Serbia, as he did last year.

How "individual leaders" will react to Lilic's statement is a completely different question. While Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the Main Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party of the Serbian Lands, feels that it does not apply to the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, Dr. Plavsic notes that this statement, along with another one by the Socialist Party of Serbia, is blackmail, and in line with Vuk Draskovic, who, she says, said "Take them there and let them live with the Muslims," and she concluded that changes were inevitable in Serbia. It is possible that a considerable part of the opposition in Serbia proper that has been citing Dr. Karadzic for a long time, such as the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], is counting on such changes. The DSS thinks that the FRY president's statement is intensifying the divisions within

the Serbian people and jeopardizing its negotiating position, and thus, in the conflict indicated between Milosevic and Karadzic, unless the latter yields, it will openly side with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. The calculation that the RS president's prospects are not that bad, and that anything can be expected, is also confirmed by the statement made by the Serbian president's follower Mile Martic after he agreed to negotiations with Croatia: "The people of the RSK are completely in solidarity with their brethren in the RS."

Protest to UN Over Muslim Offensive in Bosnia

LD2906200294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1856 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] New York, 29 Jun (TANJUG)—Dragomir Djokic, Yugoslav ambassador to the United Nations, has conveyed to Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the Security Council the Yugoslav Government's position which condemns the latest Muslim offensive and points to the danger such conduct poses to the peace process.

"The Yugoslav Government expresses its gravest concern over the danger of the deterioration of the situation in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina caused by ongoing offensive operations by the Muslim-Croat forces," the government statement says.

The Yugoslav Government demands that the Security Council "immediately undertake appropriate measures aimed at eliminating the consequences of further negative developments, which could have an adverse effect on the peace process." "It is the responsibility and obligation of the Security Council not to miss this genuine opportunity for peacefully resolving the conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina."

If this were to happen, "the conflict would escalate with unforeseeable consequences," the Yugoslav Government's statement says.

Unfortunately, the statement further says, the events that ensued after the signing of the cease-fire agreement of 8 June indicate that "not all parties in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina wish to embrace the peace option." The creation of the Muslim-Croat federation has encouraged the radical Muslim leadership to persevere in pursuing the war option.

Relying on unprecedented support from the biased media and from some international circles, the Muslim-Croat side has outmaneuvered the agreement preparing for a large-scale offensive, which is also confirmed by UN Protection Force reports, the Yugoslav statement says. These reports also indicate that the Muslim-Croat side obtained without any difficulty large quantities of the most modern weapons, despite the arms embargo.

What is "encouraging" in all this is that "Serb forces in Bosnia have so far exercised restraint, not responding to Muslim-Croat offensive actions, which has prevented the present military operations from developing into a conflict on a much larger scale," the Yugoslav Government says in its statement.

"The Yugoslav Government wishes to underline that a lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be possible through negotiations and it calls on the international community to put pressure on those who are violating the cease-fire, demanding that they should immediately cease their military operations and accept peace as the only option without further delay."

Apart from the text of the statement, Butrus-Ghali and the UN Security Council were also submitted annexes containing a list of all Muslim-Croat provocations and offensive actions.

Montenegro

Prime Minister Says Peace 'Priority'

LD3006002094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2305 GMT 29 Jun 94

[Text] Budva, Yugoslavia, June 29 (TANJUG)—The government of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro must support production adequate to meet the needs of society, while preserving peace and democratic development, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said Wednesday. Djukanovic told visiting reporters assigned to the Yugoslav Parliament that relations had improved between the federal and republican levels of government, resulting in improved economic cooperation. The prime minister said he was also pursuing international contacts in the aim of demonstrating the peace-oriented policy of Yugoslavia and in the hope of reversing the negative portrayal of Yugoslavia abroad.

Montenegro's governing Democratic Party of Socialists was represented at the press conference by party Vice President Svetozar Marovic, who said a fair and realistic peace for Bosnia was a priority for his party. Marovic said his party was working to preserve the dignity of the montenegrin people and their right to decide their own future.

Djukanovic said the Yugoslav economic recovery programme launched in January had been succeseful, but its results so far should not be considered spectacular. He said the future success of the programme would depend on the government's efforts to revive the production and generate a balanced flow of goods and capital. Djukanovic said the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro had cooperated in eliminating economic impediments to trade, and as a result, goods were now flowing freely between the two.

Prime Minister Djukanovic also said Montenegro had worked out a balance of energy supply and demand with Serbia, clearing the way for the first deliveries of domestic oil to Montenegro over the coming days.

Kosovo

Serbian Police Arrest Rector at University

AU2806201394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 28 Jun 94

[Text] The Serbian police again prevented the assembly of Prishtina University from convening today. After such an intervention, the police arrested Dr. Ejup Statovci, rector of Prishtina University, and its secretary Destan Halimi, and confiscated all the documentation of the university assembly.

In one month's time, this is the second police intervention into the Prishtina University Assembly.

Reports from Prishtina also confirm that the detention of Ismail Kastrati and Sulejman Ahmeti, leaders of the Kosova Economic Chamber, arrested a month ago, was prolonged with another thirty days.

Need for Mediated Dialogue Examined

AU2906203194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jun 94 p 12

[Report by R. Barjaktarjevic: "Vucelic—Proof That Dialogue in Being Rejected"]

[Text] The issue of Kosovo is a Serbian internal matter and for this reason there is no need for a mediator in the contacts of the state with its citizens, especially not from abroad. Nobody in the authorities and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] supports the proposal on negotiations. We will use dialogue, but we will not negotiate with the Albanians, especially not about the status of Kosovo.

Such a stance of the Serbian side, put forward by "spokesman" (as the Democratic League of Kosovo perceives him) Milorad Vucelic, chief of the SPS club of deputies in the Serbian Assembly, at the Socialists' public tribune in Kosovo Polje, has provoked sharp reactions from the Albanian side:

"In the light of ever-increasing statements by SPS representatives Mihajlo Markovic, Milorad Vucelic, and others, that Serbia is allegedly open to dialogue with the Albanian side, however, without the presence, that it to say, the mediation of a third side, the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK] sees this as a form of rejection or avoidance of dialogue and proof that the current Serbian authorities are actually not ready for serious talks with the Albanians. It seems that the Serbian authorities would like to have dialogue as a sort of acceptance of the forcefully implemented amnesty of Kosovo by the Albanians, however, such talks cannot be held or would be futile.

"Regarding Serbia's aspirations to treat the Kosovo issue as a Serbian internal matter, they are strange to say the least. Namely, Kosovo cannot be a Serbian internal issue, not merely because the fate of a peoples, in this case the Albanians, cannot be an internal matter of another people, not only because the Kosovo issue has already been discussed at the Geneva Conference, which has a special committee for Kosovo, but also because the Kosovo issue is so big and serious that Serbia could not resolve it by itself."

This LDK stance on the Serbian-Albanian dialogue that follows the statement by the SPS representative, that is, the Serbian side, has been confirmed for BORBA by LDK Vice President Dr. Fehmi Agani. The leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, also reiterated a firm determination for an independent and autonomous Kosovo. He did so in the talks with the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade (Viktor Bondalev) "in the residence of the Republic of Kosovo" in Pristina yesterday.

The LDK and its leader, Rugova, are being supported by other Albanian parties, too. However, there are more and more of those representatives of the Albanians who avoid making statements for the "Serbian press," afraid of "making slips," that is to say, of possible attacks from the powerful Rugova's information center and his aides in the LDK.

Among the Albanians, individuals in Pristina have told us, there are those who think differently and divisions are apparent. For an appropriate opinion, they mainly recommend Adem Demaci, president of the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights in Pristina, and also Gazmend Pulja, president of the Kosovo Helsinki Human Rights' Committee. However, Demaci, better known as Kosovo's "Mandela" was "engaged on business somewhere" yesterday. We asked ordinary people on the streets what they thought about the chances of Serbian- Albanian dialogue. Nazim Krasniqi, unemployed, says that this does not interest him at all. "Let the presidents up there decide. What use are the talks to me when I have nothing to live on. This is a disgrace."

Hivzi Bejtullahu, a farmer, wants clothing for his children and a new scythe. "What dialogue? Who are you?" he asks.

Gazmend Pulja, president of the Kosovo Helsinki Human Rights Committee, views these new trends "from an international perspective."

"The general view of not solely the Albanian political parties that have great support of Albanian public opinion is that only the legitimate representatives of the Albanian people can negotiate with the Serbian side. For a serious dialogue, one would wish for mediation, that is to say, the presence of a sufficiently powerful third side that would inspire principled negotiations on an equal footing. This third side could find itself within the framework of the international conference."

Regarding the statement by Mr. Milorad Vucelic, namely, that negotiations would not be conducted in the presence of a third party, it testifies to the same imposing and cynical approach that has long exceeded the boundaries of such an approach, Pulja says. The arrival of 200

foreign diplomatic, parliamentary, and other delegations, as well as the interest and the arrival of several thousand foreign journalists speaks sufficiently, he believes, of how this international issue could destabilize the entire region.

"Vucelic's statement is precisely an attempt to marginalize the problem in the region that cannot be resolved without the mediation of a third side, but that can be aggravated fruther. This is not about what somebody might want, but about a grave problem that needs to be resolved very seriously. In the extreme case, Vucelic's statement is also a good omen that a step forward has been made in the Serbian-Albanian dialogue. The Serbian officials, who until yesterday did not recognize the Albanian movement, are granting legitimacy to the Albanian side; however, by recognizing this legitimacy they are trying to hide, obscure, and cover up that the Kosovo issue and the dialogue is an internal matter for Yugoslavia and Serbia and that this will be resolved without international mediation. Vucelic's statement is aimed in this direction," Gazmend Pulja stated for BORBA.

And how do the Albanian Independent Trade Unions view all this? Professor Dr. Hajrullah Gorani, president of the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, says that "the third side" is bound. Why?

"The dialogue must be established. However, both sides, the Albanian and the Serbian, have become so entrenched that this is impossible without a third side that would accelerate the dialogue. The statement by Mr. Vucelic in Kosovo Polje is more of a pupulistic catchphrase to placate the nationalist-chauvinist leaders who are thinking, "Oh, there goes our Kosovo." It is in this role that I perceive Mr. Vucelic, but I believe that without the third side there will be no dialogue, nor can it be established," Dr. Hajrullah Gorani stated for BORBA.

Vojvodina

Croats 'Ethnically Cleansed' From Province

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[Article by Ivkica Bacic: "Vojvodina Like Ravna Gora"]

[Text] Belgrade (from VJESNIK staff correspondent)—"If anyone feels injured by the statements of Vojislav Seselj, he can go to court," was the terse reply of Margit Savovic, minister for minority and human rights in the government of the "FRY" [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], during a visit last week in Sombor. On that occasion she met representatives of Vojvodina Croats, who apprised the extremely busy minister—at least twice a week Mrs. Savovic visits the occupied areas of Croatia and encourages Serbs there to "hold out just a bit longer, since Belgrade," she says, "is not giving up on unification of all the Serbian lands"—not only of the statements of the Red Vojvoda to the effect that "there is not place for Croats in Serbia," but also of the "operationalization," which has already largely "cleansed" Vojvodina of Croats.

The Minister Had No Idea

About 35,000 Croats have moved out in the last three years, and it is an almost daily "happening" for the remaining Croatian families to sell their farms, pack their bags, and leave the plains of Vojvodina, which in 1992, according to the census, was the home of 100,000 Croats. Minister Savovic, on her own admission, "had no idea" of the systematic terror to which the Vojvodina Croats have been subjected and which has forced them to leave their homes. The only thing she knows, as she said in a conversation with representatives of the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina [DSHV] is that "the Croats are moving out of Yugoslavia voluntarily, by contrast with the Serbs, who are being driven out of Croatia." Minister Savovic "had no idea" about the organized campaign of a number of groups to put pressure on the Croats, groups which have already thrown hundreds of bombs into the yards of Croatian houses all over Vojvodina and at Catholic churches, groups which have "painted" chetnik slogans on almost every Croat house.

The minister knows still less about the Vojvodina part of Srem having been almost entirely "ethnically cleansed" of Croats, that one out of every three citizens of Croat nationality has moved out of Petrovaradin, that about 80 percent of the Croats have "voluntarily" left Kukujevci. Not to mention "legendary Hrtkovci." As we have said, Minister Savovic responded to all these facts and figures by saying that the Croats are leaving "voluntarily," and she referred those remaining to judicial authorities, "if they feel threatened" either by the threats of the Red Vojvoda or the threat of Vojvoda Sinisa Vucinic, leader of the Serbian Royal Movement [SRP]. The other day Vucinic warned Croats and Hungarians in Subotica that Subotica would be "turned into Ravna Gora," the reason being that "on Ravna Gora the first guerrilla, Draza Mihailovic, gathered patriots in the fight against fascism, while in Subotica today the fascists Bela Tonkovic and Andras Agoston are operating; they should be arrested and their followers driven out," Vucinic threatened. "If that assertion frightens you, go to court," Minister Savovic advised Vojvodina Croats, setting off once again for where she believes her place is, that is, among the Serbs in the occupied parts of Croatia. To be sure, the minister is not paid for that, nor is that part of her job description. But in view of the fact that there is no work for her at home—"the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia are not threatened; on the contrary, they enjoy all rights in conformity with the highest European standards" are her words—she has to kill the time somehow.

Tonkovic Writes to Savovic

On the first day of June, we recall, a bomb exploded in front of the door of the Franciscan church in Subotica.

The government, which includes Minister Savovic, condemned most severely that "outbreak of vandalism," promising "vigorous investigation by the competent authorities." Two weeks have passed since then, none of the competent authorities has said a word, unless we include among the "competent authorities for Subotica" Vojvoda Vucinic, whom we have already mentioned and who "conducted his own investigation" and informed the public that the bomb at the door of the Catholic church was "placed by leaders of the party of Vojvodina Hungarians. That is as clear as day, and we will soon file criminal charges against them," Vucinic promised.

Since 1 June there has been correspondence between Bela Tonkovic, leader of the DSHV, and Minister Savovic. Informing Savovic of the exposition, Tonkovic recalled in his letter that this is not the first "case of vandalism," since chetnik slogans have been written countless times on the walls of the Franciscan church and on the cross in front of the church, "but neither the police nor your ministry have done anything against the perpetrators, which has only encouraged the perpetrators," Tonkovic said. Minister Savovic answered that first letter of his with the advice, "Don't give way to emotions, and have full confidence in the government authorities, which, just like my ministry, will do everything within our jurisdiction. In a second letter, meanwhile, Bela Tonkovic responds to the remark about 'emotions' by saying 'it is not a matter of emotions, but of a well-founded concern because of the ineffectiveness of those very agencies of the government.' You yourself know about the bombs with which vandals have attacked Catholic churches in Srem and Backa and monuments related to the cultural history of the Croats in this region, and also the houses of many Croats. The last attacks were on 7 May in Sremska Kamenica and Plavna and on 15 May in Bac. All these attacks are aimed at starting a 'voluntary exodus of Croats,' as you like to call the expulsion," Tonkovic wrote to Savovic, and in conclusion he called for "us to undertake jointly to resolve the outstanding issues of the status and rights of the Croatian ethnic community in Yugoslavia regardless of mutual recognition of the FRY and Croatia, since both status and rights are something inherent."

Minister Savovic has still not replied to that second letter from Tonkovic, unless what she said the other day to the Croats in Sombor can be taken as her response. "We do not recognize Croatia as a state. Under international law a minority is a people that has a parent state, and therefore the Croats in the FRY cannot be an ethnic minority, and there is no question about the status of a nationality," Minister Margit Savovic instructed the remaining Croats in Vojvodina, those who still have not moved out "voluntarily," repeating that "the Croats can turn to the courts if they are frightened by the statements of Vojislav Seselj." Until then he and the other latter-day chetnik vojvodas will be making a new Ravna Gora of all of Vojvodina, not just Subotica.